Investigating the Future
An in-depth study of Public Opinion in Cyprus
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SURVEY PROFILE

- **Sample Size:** 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots
- **Sampling Process:** Multi-stage Random Stratified Sampling
- **Method of Data Collection:** Face to Face Interviews with a Structured Questionnaire at Homes of Respondents and in their Native Language
- **Period of Data Collection:** 06th October – 06th November 2009
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- **Field Work:** Symmetron Market Research for Greek Cypriots and KADEM Cyprus Social Research for Turkish Cypriots
SECTION A

UNDERLYING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES
Perspectives on Reconciliation (Greek Cypriots)

A very strong majority of Greek Cypriots recognizes that the Cyprus Problem must be solved through a mutually acceptable compromise. A smaller majority additionally acknowledges that they would not mind having Turkish Cypriot neighbours. Finally, the notion of using violence as a means for achieving political goals is abhorred by the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot community.
Perspectives on Reconciliation (Turkish Cypriots)

A majority of Turkish Cypriots believes that the Cyprus Problem must be solved on the basis of a mutually acceptable compromise. Having said that, opinions are divided regarding the desirability of co-existence with Greek Cypriots in the context of day-to-day life. The use of violence as a means for achieving political goals is opposed by a strong majority of Turkish Cypriots.
Greek Cypriots still tend to identify strongly with their Greek cultural roots, but many of them have now abandoned the notion of “Greece as mother country”.
Turkish Cypriots still remain loyal to the notion of “Turkey as motherland”, at least to the extent that a majority of them acknowledges having Turkish cultural roots.
Managing contested identities

Greek Cypriots are equally divided between those who consider themselves more Cypriot than Greek and those who consider themselves Greek and Cypriot to the same degree while few consider themselves to be more Greek than Cypriot. Turkish Cypriots present a more uniform picture, with a clear majority considering themselves to be Cypriot and Turkish to the same degree, and about equal minorities considering themselves, on the one hand, to be more Cypriot than Turkish, and on the other hand, more Turkish than Cypriot.
Values that Cypriots identify with

To the question of which values they would teach their children, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots agree: High priority is placed on cultivating a sense of responsibility, becoming independent, and learning tolerance and respect for other people. In contrast, both communities place a low priority on cultivating imagination and creativity and in learning to not be selfish.
Greek Cypriots are currently exhibiting a small trend towards the right in a somewhat polarized context with a comparatively weak centre. Turkish Cypriots are more equally distributed, with one third self-identifying as right wing, one third as centrists, and one third as left-wing.
Greek Cypriots display a moderate to high level of trust towards the Judiciary and the Church, a moderate level of trust towards the Government and the Army, and a low level of trust towards Political Parties and the Police.
Trust of Institutions (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots display a high level of trust towards the Army, a moderate to high level of trust towards the Government, the Judiciary and the Police, a moderate level of trust towards the religious authorities, and a low level of trust towards the Political Parties.
More specifically regarding the handling of the Cyprus Problem, could you tell me how much confidence you have in each of these actors who are in different ways involved in the peace process? (Greek Cypriots)

Trust of actors involved in the Peace Process (Greek Cypriots)

In relation to the Peace Process, Greek Cypriots primarily trust their own Leader, Demetris Christofias, and the European Union, though it should be noted that even for these actors a significant skeptic contingent exists. In contrast, Greek Cypriots strongly mistrust the governments of the United Kingdom and Turkey.
More specifically regarding the handling of the Cyprus Problem, could you tell me how much confidence you have in each of these actors who are in different ways involved in the peace process? (Turkish Cypriots)

Trust of actors involved in the Peace Process (Turkish Cypriots)

In relation to the Peace Process, Turkish Cypriots primarily trust the government of Turkey, and to a lesser extent their own Leader, Mehmet Ali Talat. The European Union comes third, though in its case half of Turkish Cypriots declare scepticism. Least trusted is the “Greek side”, as symbolized by the government of Greece and the person of the Greek Cypriot Leader, Demetris Christofias.
SECTION B

THE PEACE PROCESS AND A FUTURE REFERENDUM
Is there desire that the Peace Process should succeed?

A majority of the Greek Cypriot community would like to see the peace process being concluded successfully and leading to a Comprehensive Settlement while a plurality of Turkish Cypriots also espouses the same goal.
Is there expectation that the Peace Process will actually succeed?

In contrast, majorities in both communities have low expectations that the peace process will actually succeed in delivering a Comprehensive Settlement.
Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and considering each of the alternative settlement models presented below, how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of these models? (Greek Cypriots)

**Evaluation of alternative Settlement models (Greek Cypriots)**

Greek Cypriots would ideally prefer a unitary state but would be prepared to live with a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation. In contrast, Greek Cypriots unequivocally reject a two state solution, a confederal solution or a continuation of the status quo.
Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and considering each of the alternative settlement models presented below, how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of these models? (Turkish Cypriots)

![Graph showing support levels for different settlement models.]

**Evaluation of alternative Settlement models (Turkish Cypriots)**

Turkish Cypriots would ideally prefer a two state solution but would be prepared to live with a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation. Other models for the future (confederation, continuation of the status quo, unitary state) receive lower levels of support without being rejected outright.
Has the agreed Settlement Framework been accepted by the wider public?

As for the agreed basis of negotiations between the two leaders – namely that the settlement should constitute “a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation with Political Equality, as agreed in UN Security Council Resolutions, with two constituent states of equal status and a single international personality, sovereignty and citizenship” – both communities are expressing ambivalence without rejecting it outright. The skeptic contingent is somewhat stronger in the Greek Cypriot community, while in both communities “moderate support” of the framework is a more frequent condition that “strong support”.
Accompaniment of specific elements in the agreed framework (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots are most positive over the principles of single sovereignty, single citizenship and single international personality, they are ambivalent over federalism, political equality and bicomunality, while they are very sceptical of bizonality and of the notion that there will be Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent states of equal status.
Acceptance of specific elements in the agreed framework (Turkish Cypriots)

As for the Turkish Cypriots, they are strongly supportive of the principles of bizonality, bicommunality, political equality, and the notion that there will be Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot constituent states of equal status. At the same time, they are ambivalent over federalism and the principle of a single international personality, and finally they are somewhat negative over the principles of a single citizenship and a single sovereignty.
Negotiating priorities of the wider public

Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots tend to perceive similarly the priority areas where the negotiations should be focusing. Specifically, both communities give first priority to the Security and Guarantees dossier, second priority to issues of Property and Territory, while third priority is given to Constitutional and Governance issues. The only dossier where the prioritization between the two communities significantly differs is the issue of the people from Turkey, which is seen as a priority by a majority of Greek Cypriots - actually their second priority after Security and Guarantees - but is only seen as a priority by one quarter of Turkish Cypriots.
Trending to Yes, or trending to No?

To the question of what they would vote in a future referendum, assuming the negotiations between the two leaders conclude and a settlement plan is drafted, the two communities show a similar orientation. Specifically, about a fifth of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are committed ‘Yes’ voters, about a quarter of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are committed ‘No’ voters, while the rest are swing voters who have yet to make a final decision, many of whom are presumably waiting to see the final shape of the deal or the positioning of opinion leaders before making up their mind.
"Vote in a potential future referendum", correlated with "Age group" (Greek Cypriots)

Younger Greek Cypriots are more likely to display an intention to vote No in a future referendum, though even in their case a majority is open to the possibility of voting Yes. The oldest Greek Cypriots, age 65+, are most likely to display an intention to vote Yes in a future referendum.
Among Turkish Cypriots, the oldest individuals, age 65+, are displaying the strongest trend towards a No vote. The younger age groups, aged 18 – 24 and 25 – 34, and the middle age groups, 45 – 54 and 55 – 64 are displaying a comparative openness to the possibility of voting Yes.
Intended Vote in a Future Referendum by Political Party (Greek Cypriots)

In the Greek Cypriot community, political parties are already displaying distinct trends in the intended vote pattern of their supporters. AKEL supporters are most likely to favor a Yes vote in a future referendum, then DISY voters, and then EDEK voters, while DIKO supporters are clearly trending towards a No vote in a future referendum.
"Vote in a potential future referendum", correlated with "Vote in most recent parliamentary elections" (Turkish Cypriots)

In the Turkish Cypriot community, CTP and TDP supporters are trending towards a Yes vote in a future referendum, while UBP and DP supporters are trending towards a No vote. In all cases, significant groups exist within each party that support the alternate viewpoint.
SECTION C

THE SECURITY AND GUARANTEES DOSSIER
Evaluating Potential Guarantors (Greek Cypriots)

In evaluating potential guarantors of a settlement, Greek Cypriots strongly reject the United Kingdom and Turkey, while also tending to reject a potential role for Greece. In contrast, there is tolerance for a possible UN Security Council role and strong support for an EU role in guaranteeing the settlement.
Evaluating Potential Guarantors (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots strongly prefer a role for Turkey in guaranteeing a settlement but not for the other two historic guarantors, the United Kingdom or Greece. As for the UN Security Council, Turkish Cypriots exhibit ambivalence over its possible role, while the same ambivalence is exhibited regarding a possible role for the EU.
How acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following options?
(Greek Cypriots)

**Timetables for Troop Withdrawal (Greek Cypriots)**

Greek Cypriots reject any notion of delayed troop departure for Turkish and Greek troops while in contrast they deem the immediate departure of all Turkish and Greek troops to be absolutely essential. Rejection levels, however, are lower in cases where a brief transition period is proposed.
Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, seem willing to tolerate various models of transition, though in fact all related options are controversial to one segment or other of the Turkish Cypriot community. There doesn’t seem to be a solution to this matter, which would involve a symmetrical presence or withdrawal of Turkish and Greek troops, which would simultaneously satisfy a majority of Turkish Cypriots.
SECTION D

THE PROPERTY AND TERRITORY DOSSIERS
Restitution or Compensation? (Greek Cypriots)

Seen as a trend, about 80% of Greek Cypriots favor priority being given to original owners, about 20% are open to both types of solution, while there are almost none who favor priority being given to current users. Beyond this overall trend, however, some differentiations can be discerned on the basis of property type. Specifically, Greek Cypriots are willing to show comparatively more flexibility (*i.e.* possibly accept priority being granted to current users) in cases where public utilities have been built, and in cases of properties being used for commercial purposes or industrial production.
Restitution or Compensation? (Turkish Cypriots)

Seen as a trend, about 50% of Turkish Cypriots prefer that current users should have priority over disputed properties, about 25% are open to both types of solution, and about 25% prefer that priority should be given to original owners. Beyond this overall trend, however, some differentiations can be discerned on the basis of property type. Specifically, Turkish Cypriots in turn are willing to show comparatively more flexibility (i.e. possibly accept priority being given to original owners) in cases of land that is vacant and unused.
“The life before”: Strength of memories

Greek Cypriot displaced persons declare that they have strong and vivid memories of life at their original home, and even among those who were too young to have direct memories, parents have tended to fill in the gaps by speaking extensively to their children about life at their original home. In contrast, few Turkish Cypriots maintain strong and vivid memories of life at their original home, while Turkish Cypriot parents do not as a rule speak much to their children about “the life before”.
“The life before”: Quality of memories

Among Greek Cypriots, memories of life at their original home are almost uniformly viewed as very positive, whereas among Turkish Cypriots different groups report positive, neutral or negative memories of life at their original home.
If given a range of choices as below, what would you do today with your original property or properties in the context of a settlement?

“And if you get your property back?”…

When asked to consider options regarding their original properties in the context of a settlement, almost half of Greek Cypriot displaced property owners say that they would want the option to use it as their primary residence (though, as will be seen below, this finding should be examined in the context of whether return will be under Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot administration), while one third are interested in the option of using it as a holiday home. Among Turkish Cypriot displaced property owners, only one third say they would use their original home as a primary residence, while one in five would rent their property out for income.
Willingness of Greek Cypriots to return under Greek Cypriot administration

Greek Cypriot displaced persons display a strong willingness to return to their original home, assuming that it is returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
Willingness of Greek Cypriots to return under Turkish Cypriot administration

In contrast, the great majority of Greek Cypriot displaced persons declare that they would not be interested to return to their original home, if it is returned under Turkish Cypriot administration.
SECTION E

THE GOVERNANCE AND POWER SHARING DOSSIER
Regarding the election of the Presidency of the Federal Government, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of the following approaches? (Greek Cypriots)

- The people to elect the Presidency directly
  - Entirely Unacceptable: 5, 16%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 75%
  - Satisfactory: 49%, 18%
  - Highly Desirable: 20%, 9%
  - Absolutely Essential: 4%

- The people to elect the political parties that will be in the Federal Senate, and then the representatives of these political parties in the senate to go on and elect the Presidency
  - Entirely Unacceptable: 68%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 17%
  - Satisfactory: 11%
  - Highly Desirable: 3%
  - Absolutely Essential: 0%

- The people to elect delegates, each delegate pre-assigned to their candidate of choice, and the college of delegates to then convene and formally elect the Presidency
  - Entirely Unacceptable: 16%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 75%
  - Satisfactory: 49%, 18%
  - Highly Desirable: 20%, 9%
  - Absolutely Essential: 4%

**E lecting the Federal Executive (Greek Cypriots)**

Greek Cypriots strongly believe that the federal executive should be directly elected by the people, and oppose alternative systems for indirect election of the federal executive, such as through the federal senate or through a college of delegates.
Electing the Federal Executive (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots also tend to prefer the option of a directly elected federal executive, but they remain open to the possibility of a system for indirect election of the federal executive, such as through the federal senate or elected delegates.
Decision Making within the Federal Executive (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots prefer models of the executive where decisions will be made jointly, such as a presidential council functioning as a collective decision making body or a president / vice president team where decisions will be made by consensus, and reject models which would give unbridled authority at a federal level to any single individual, presumably interpreting as threatening the possibility of a Turkish Cypriot having unbridled executive authority over all of Cyprus for any given period of time.
**Decision Making within the Federal Executive (Turkish Cypriots)**

To the extent that they accept or reject power sharing in principle, Turkish Cypriots seem flexible over the precise details of how decisions will be made. As a trend, we see about a quarter of Turkish Cypriots rejecting all power sharing models, presumably preferring a two state governance model, then a quarter of Turkish Cypriots tolerating power sharing models as a necessary solution, and finally about half of Turkish Cypriots who actively look forward to having a model of shared governance.