Next Steps in the Peace Talks

An island-wide study of public opinion in Cyprus
SECTIONS

• SECTION A: The Peace Process

• SECTION B: Motivating Factors

• SECTION C: Constraining Factors

• SECTION D: The Settlement Framework

• SECTION E: Next Steps
SURVEY PROFILE

- **Sample Size:** 800 Greek Cypriots and 800 Turkish Cypriots
- **Sampling Process:** Multi-stage Random Stratified Sampling
- **Method of Data Collection:** Face to Face Interviews with a Structured Questionnaire at Homes of Respondents and in their Native Language
- **Period of Data Collection:** 5th – 30th September 2010
- **Project Team:** Ahmet Sözen, Spyros Christou, Alexandros Lordos, Erol Kaymak
- **Questionnaire Design:** Through a participatory process which included key stakeholders from both communities
- **Field Work:** Symmetron Market Research for Greek Cypriots and KADEM Cyprus Social Research for Turkish Cypriots
SECTION A

THE PEACE PROCESS
Is there desire that the Peace Process should succeed?

A majority of the Greek Cypriot community would like to see the peace process being concluded successfully and leading to a Comprehensive Settlement while a majority of Turkish Cypriots similarly espouses the same goal. However, respondents have very little faith that there will be a breakthrough.
In relation to the process by which the negotiations should be taking place, how do you evaluate each of the following options?

- The UN should submit ideas, but leave it up to the two sides to decide whether and how they will make use of them
- The UN should just convene the meetings, but not be involved in any way in the substance of what is being discussed
- The UN should arbitrate and make decisions as to what would be in the final peace plan, if the two sides find it difficult to reach convergence

**The role of the United Nations**

Arbitration is the least popular role for the UN, while both communities strongly favor a role for the UN which would involve submitting ideas, but leaving it up to the sides to decide whether and how they will make use of them.
The roles of Turkey, Greece and the European Union

Both communities support an enhanced role for the EU in the negotiations. In contrast, Greek Cypriots are reluctant to include ‘motherlands’ in the negotiation framework while Turkish Cypriots are in favor. Neither community supports changing the format of the talks so that they no longer take place between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus.
The easiest issues in the talks should be tackled first, and then progressively the most difficult

Both leaders should focus on making more concessions, in order to speed up the process

There should be parallel discussion of all remaining dossiers, through a process of give and take between all of them

The two leaderships should aim to have a framework agreement by the end of the year

Meetings between the two leaders should be taking place at an increased frequency

The two leaderships should jointly set benchmarks for what they want to achieve, and by when

In relation to the process by which the negotiations should be taking place, how do you evaluate each of the following options?

The role of the two leaders

People generally expect the leaders to be setting benchmarks in order to achieve a mutually agreed settlement, and additionally that they should be meeting as frequently as possible to this end. Additionally, both communities – but especially the Greek Cypriots – tend to prefer a parallel discussion of all remaining dossiers with a process of give and take between them.
For each topic, negotiations should first be taking place at the level of representatives of the leaders to prepare the ground, then the leaders themselves should be convening for intensive talks.

The role of expert technical committees, that explore ways to enhance day to day cooperation between the two communities, should be upgraded in the talks.

The role of expert working groups, that study pending substantive issues in depth on behalf of the leaders and submit their recommendations, should be upgraded in the talks.

In relation to the process by which the negotiations should be taking place, how do you evaluate each of the following options?

There is general support for the role of experts and representatives in the negotiation process.
There should be a mechanism whereby ordinary citizens can submit their views regarding the peace process to the two leaderships

The role of the wider public

There is general consensus that the wider public should be more actively included in the negotiation process.
SECTION B

MOTIVATING FACTORS
How important to you are the following possible reasons for solving the Cyprus problem?

- To reduce the risk of armed conflict in the future: 95% (Greek Cypriots), 49% (Turkish Cypriots)
- To have more effective fighting of crime across the whole island: 86% (Greek Cypriots), 47% (Turkish Cypriots)
- To achieve the departure of foreign troops from the island: 98% (Greek Cypriots), 31% (Turkish Cypriots)
- To achieve the termination of the guarantees and rights of intervention: 96% (Greek Cypriots), 25% (Turkish Cypriots)

Motivating factors - Security

Greek Cypriots associate a settlement with a new security regime that will enhance their sense of security. Turkish Cypriots do not consider changes in security provisions to be a motivating factor for a settlement.
There is general agreement that a settlement may be economically beneficial, and hence desirable. However, Turkish Cypriots are less motivated by defense spending savings.
How important to you are the following possible reasons for solving the Cyprus problem?

- To allow refugees to return to their homes: 99% (Greek Cypriots), 57% (Turkish Cypriots)
- To control the number of future migrants and prevent further demographic change: 93% (Greek Cypriots), 47% (Turkish Cypriots)
- To be able to move around Cyprus freely, without checkpoints and show of ID cards: 94% (Greek Cypriots), 46% (Turkish Cypriots)
- To allow refugees to receive compensation for their homes: 84% (Greek Cypriots), 29% (Turkish Cypriots)
- To recover the control of towns and villages that were lost in 1963/1974: 98% (Greek Cypriots), 28% (Turkish Cypriots)

Motivating Factors – Reintegration, Refugees and Migration

This set of factors generally motivate Greek Cypriots, since they affect the rights of displaced persons. However, as this tends to undermine bizonality, Turkish Cypriots are less enthusiastic.
Motivating Factors – Normalization and Lifting Isolation

Not surprisingly, Turkish Cypriots have an interest in lifting their international isolation, which serves to motivate people in favor of a settlement. Whereas these items do not inspire Greek Cypriots, many Greek Cypriots share a concern that relations between themselves (i.e. Cyprus) and Turkey should also normalize.
Motivating Factors – Cyprus in the world

Most people are motivated by the potential for regional and international harmony. This perspective is more pronounced among Greek Cypriots.
How important to you are the following possible reasons for solving the Cyprus problem?

- **To bring Cyprus into a new era of long term sustainable peace**: 98% (Greek Cypriots), 73% (Turkish Cypriots)
- **To remove this problem from future generations**: 89% (Greek Cypriots), 70% (Turkish Cypriots)
- **To get a chance to focus on other issues in our society, culture and economy**: 88% (Greek Cypriots), 70% (Turkish Cypriots)
- **To put an end to the bad feelings the Cyprus Problem creates**: 84% (Greek Cypriots), 69% (Turkish Cypriots)
- **To ease the suffering of the other community**: 42% (Greek Cypriots), 28% (Turkish Cypriots)

**Motivating Factors – Peace**

Whereas there is a yearning for peace in both communities, seen as an opportunity to move the agenda on to other matters affecting the respective communities, empathy remains a relatively scarce commodity.
SECTION C

CONSTRAINING FACTORS
How important to you are the following possible reasons for **not** wanting a solution to the Cyprus problem?

- The other side would never accept the actual compromises and concessions that are needed for a fair and viable settlement
  - Greek Cypriots: 84%
  - Turkish Cypriots: 70%

- The other side would not honor the agreement and therefore implementation would fail
  - Greek Cypriots: 82%
  - Turkish Cypriots: 68%

**Constraining Factors - Trust**

Limiting the attractiveness of a settlement is the perception that the other side will fail to accept or honor the terms of a settlement.
A Turkish Cypriot or person from Turkey (a Greek Cypriot or person from Greece) might end up being the President of unified Cyprus

I do not desire to be governed through a political system where the two communities share power

A solution might lead to a dysfunctional system of administration

Constraining Factors – Governance and Control

Greek Cypriots are especially concerned about issues of governance and control, while both communities display anxiety as to the prospect of being dominated. A possibly dysfunctional government is also among the serious concerns of both communities. Perhaps as a reflection of these fears, respondents from both communities express opposition to power sharing.
How important to you are the following possible reasons for not wanting a solution the Cyprus problem?

- We might end up inheriting social problems, such as crime or corruption, from the other community
- Through a settlement, conditions for renewed violence between the two communities might be created
- Too much time has passed with the two communities being apart, and we can no longer live together
- A solution might alienate us from our cultural origins
- A solution might undermine our religious basis

Greek Cypriots | Turkish Cypriots
--- | ---
47% | 56%
69% | 56%
32% | 53%
35% | 38%
35% | 35%

**Constraining Factors – Alienation and cultural fear**

Both communities fear the prospect of renewed conflict between them in case a settlement is reached, while there are also concerns that social problems might be inherited from the other community. Turkish Cypriots additionally fear that the two communities have grown too far apart and that they can no longer live together. Neither community is expressing anxiety over a possible erosion of cultural/religious identity through a settlement.
How important to you are the following possible reasons for not wanting a solution the Cyprus problem?

- The cost of solving the property issue in a solution might be too high
- Our community might be called to carry the burden of the cost of the solution, and end up subsidizing the other community
- A solution might transfer tourism and property development business away from us, and towards the area under the control of the other community
- The federal government might be too expensive to operate
- A solution might bring about a reduction of our standard of living

**Constraining Factors – Economics and Distributional Consequences**

Greek Cypriots express some skepticism regarding the distributional fiscal costs associated with a federal system, while this does not seem to be related to the costs of government per se. Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, are more concerned about the costs inherent in solving the property issue.
My disappointment over the fact that Greek Cypriot properties in the north have been built over and sold to foreigners causes me to not want a settlement.

My disappointment over the fact that the current Turkish Cypriot administration does not enjoy the same political status as the Greek Cypriot administration causes me to not want a settlement.

My disappointment over the fact that the peace process has been going on endlessly, causes me to not want a settlement.

My disappointment over the fact that the UN system favors the Turkish (Greek) side causes me to not want a settlement.

Constraining Factors - Disappointment

Disappointment and past experiences tend to deter many Turkish Cypriots, but fewer Greek Cypriots, from taking a leap of faith in favor of a settlement.
How important to you are the following possible reasons for not wanting a solution the Cyprus problem?

- If the solution plan does not create conditions of true political equality between the two communities: 71% Greek Cypriots, 71% Turkish Cypriots
- If the solution plan requires some Turkish Cypriots to abandon their current residences: 67% Greek Cypriots, 67% Turkish Cypriots
- If the solution plan deviates from the implementation of human rights, European principles and European values: 63% Greek Cypriots, 95% Turkish Cypriots
- If the solution plan includes provisions to return territory to the Greek Cypriots: 60% Greek Cypriots, 60% Turkish Cypriots
- If the solution plan requires some people from Turkey to leave Cyprus: 56% Greek Cypriots, 56% Turkish Cypriots
- If the solution plan includes provisions of ethnic and geographic segregation: 78% Greek Cypriots, 78% Turkish Cypriots
- If I see that the solution plan benefits the interests of Turkey over the interests of Cypriots: 96% Greek Cypriots, 96% Turkish Cypriots
- If I see that based on the solution plan, many people from Turkey would remain: 79% Greek Cypriots, 79% Turkish Cypriots

Greek Cypriot views on these factors are somewhat homogeneous, demonstrating society-wide convictions on the elements of a settlement plan. Turkish Cypriot views are more complex, demonstrating greater internal division on some issues. Both communities are concerned to see that there will be some form of political equality between them, presumably understood as ‘freedom from the threat of domination’ by the other.
SECTION D

THE SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK
Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and considering each of the alternative settlement models presented below, how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of these general models? (Greek Cypriots)

**Overall settlement – Greek Cypriots**

Greek Cypriots favor a unitary state over other alternatives. Federation is a distant second, but still acceptable to a majority of the population. A continuation of the status quo is seen as unacceptable by the majority of the population.
Regarding the overall framework of a Comprehensive Settlement, and considering each of the alternative settlement models presented below, how acceptable or unacceptable, in principle, do you consider each of these general models? (Turkish Cypriots)

**Overall settlement – Turkish Cypriots**

Turkish Cypriots favor two states, but are prepared to accept federation as a compromise. Continuation of the status quo is also a tolerable option to Turkish Cypriots.
A Bizonal Bicommunal Federation which includes freedom of settlement and freedom of property ownership throughout the territory of Cyprus and puts an end to the guarantees of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Support for versions of federalism – 3 freedoms and end to guarantees

This version is more congruent with official Greek Cypriot positions, so the relative support among Greek Cypriots is in line with expectations.
A Bizonal Bicommunal Federation which restricts settlement and property ownership rights based on communal origin, and maintains the guarantees of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom

Support for versions of federalism – restrictions on 3 freedoms and continuation of guarantees

This version approximates the official positions of the Turkish Cypriot side. A majority of Greek Cypriots dismiss it out of hand.
A unitary state based on the principle of ‘one person one vote’, where all will have the same rights and responsibilities as individual citizens of an EU state regardless of their communal origin, while ‘communities’ will no longer be considered to be politically valid entries.

**Support for alternatives to federalism – unitary state**

Greek Cypriot support for a unitary state is robust. Somewhat surprisingly, a significant minority of Turkish Cypriots also express support for this.

*INTERPRETATION WARNING:* As a unitary state model is rarely discussed in the Turkish Cypriot community, some respondents may have not fully understood the implications of such a model, specifically on how it would impact bizonality. Instead, the reference to becoming citizens of an EU state may have further boosted levels of Turkish Cypriot support to this proposal. The findings presented in a previous slide, for support of the model “One unitary state and central government for the whole of Cyprus” – where rejection rates were higher among Turkish Cypriots - offer an alternative interpretation of levels of support, though in that case also important aspects of such a model (e.g. equal rights, EU status) were not fully explicated.
Support for alternatives to federalism – TRNC recognition

In line with expectations, a large majority of Greek Cypriots reject non-consensual TRNC recognition out of hand. A significant numbers of Turkish Cypriots also disagree with this approach, perhaps reflecting an unwillingness to increase further the tension between the two communities.
A consensual negotiated separation which includes a property and territory settlement, and with both states as members of the EU

**Acceptability**

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<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entirely unacceptable</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerable if necessary</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>27%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entirely unacceptable</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<td>Tolerable if necessary</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>58%</td>
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**Likelihood**

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<tr>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely to occur</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely to occur</td>
<td>55%</td>
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**Support for alternatives to federalism – ‘velvet’ divorce**

The more consensual partition model, akin to the breakup of the former Czechoslovakia is also unpopular among Greek Cypriots, while garnering support among Turkish Cypriots. Overall, this model is less polarizing than non-consensual partition. It should be noted that most stakeholders who participated in the design of the questionnaire do not consider such a model to be practically feasible, insofar as there is no precedent for an existing EU membership (in this case, of the Republic of Cyprus) to be divided into two EU memberships.

*INTERPRETATION WARNING: Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot respondents may have interpreted the notion of a “property and territory settlement” differently, Greek Cypriots expecting a better deal than under a federation while Turkish Cypriots not necessarily making such a distinction.*
A consensual negotiated separation which includes a property and territory settlement, with the Greek Cypriot state continuing the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot state making its own application for eventual EU membership.

**Support for alternatives to federalism – Turkish Cypriot bid to join EU separately**

In this variant in which the TC community joins the EU separately, a similar pattern emerges.

*INTERPRETATION WARNING:* Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot respondents may have interpreted the notion of a “property and territory settlement” differently, Greek Cypriots expecting a better deal than under a federation while Turkish Cypriots not necessarily making such a distinction.
A consensual negotiated separation which includes a property and territory settlement, with the Greek Cypriot state continuing the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot state staying outside the European Union.

**Support for alternatives to federalism – Turkish Cypriots out of the EU**

Partition in the absence of an EU perspective is strikingly less attractive to Turkish Cypriots than partition inclusive of EU membership.

*INTERPRETATION WARNING: Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot respondents may have interpreted the notion of a “property and territory settlement” differently, Greek Cypriots expecting a better deal than under a federation while Turkish Cypriots not necessarily making such a distinction.*
Support for alternatives to federalism - Taiwanization

Greek Cypriots oppose alternative forms of normalizing relations between the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the international community. Many Turkish Cypriots also reject ‘Taiwanization’, which perhaps is being understood as a half-measure that would serve to deny them a more equal role in the international community.
An autonomous Turkish Cypriot region in the north, which will gradually be gaining its independence through direct supervision of the international community, similar to the model of Kosovo.

Support for alternatives to federalism - Kosovoization

A similar pattern emerges here.
Support for alternatives to federalism - annexation

Greek Cypriots strongly reject the absorption of the north into Turkey, even more so than they reject ‘TRNC’ recognition. Significantly, many Turkish Cypriots also reject this.
A continuation of the current situation, whereby the Greek-Cypriot administered Republic of Cyprus is recognized internationally but only controls the southern part of Cyprus, while the Turkish Cypriot community is in economic, cultural, and political isolation but still controls the northern part of Cyprus through Turkey’s assistance.

**Support for alternatives to federalism – continuation of the status quo**

A majority of Greek Cypriots reject the status quo, while a majority of Turkish Cypriots feel they can tolerate it as a ‘necessary evil’.
Greek Cypriot preferred models

Greek Cypriots strongly support their own interpretation of federation, but consider the Turkish Cypriot interpretation of federation to be even worse than the status quo. A consensual separation, while unacceptable, is seen as marginally preferable to the status quo. The worst possible outcome as perceived by Greek Cypriots, is annexation of the north by Turkey.
**Turkish Cypriot preferred models**

In contrast, Turkish Cypriots strongly support their interpretation of federation, while consider the Greek Cypriot interpretation of federation to worse than the status quo. A consensual separation with both states in the EU is seen as the ideal outcome, even more preferred than the Turkish Cypriot interpretation of federation, while interim solutions such as Taiwanization or Kosovoization are rejected as half measures. Opposition to annexation of the north by Turkey seems to be the one point where the perspectives of the two communities converge.
SECTION E

NEXT STEPS
If we reach the end of the year and no significant progress in the peace talks has yet been made, how would you evaluate each of the following options regarding next steps?

- **Lift all economic, social and cultural isolations from the Turkish Cypriot community**
  - 16% of Greek Cypriots support this option, while 79% of Turkish Cypriots do.

- **Implement the direct trade regulation**
  - 10% of Greek Cypriots support this option, while 76% of Turkish Cypriots do.

- **Terminate the talks and move towards recognition of the ‘TRNC’**
  - 3% of Greek Cypriots support this option, while 58% of Turkish Cypriots do.

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**Terminating the talks / lifting isolations**

In case there is no progress in the peace talks by December, Turkish Cypriots would welcome a shift in emphasis towards lifting isolations and recognizing the ‘TRNC’, but such alternatives gather almost no support among Greek Cypriots.
If we reach the end of the year and no significant progress in the peace talks has yet been made, how would you evaluate each of the following options regarding next steps?

- **Put the current basis of talks to referendum in both communities, if not accepted change the basis of the talks**
  - Greek Cypriots: 53%
  - Turkish Cypriots: 55%

- **Change the basis of the talks, to negotiated partition through a territory / property for recognition deal**
  - Greek Cypriots: 11%
  - Turkish Cypriots: 53%

- **Close down UNFICYP operations in Cyprus**
  - Greek Cypriots: 11%
  - Turkish Cypriots: 48%

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**Radically changing the basis of negotiations**

Greek Cypriots may toy with the idea of changing the basis of the talks, but not if the new basis would be negotiated partition. Many Turkish Cypriots would support closing down UNFICYP operations, but this option is rejected by Greek Cypriots.
If we reach the end of the year and no significant progress in the peace talks has yet been made, how would you evaluate each of the following options regarding next steps?

1. Declare a temporary dead-end and assign responsibility for the failure while recommendations for a new round of talks are prepared by the UN
   - Greek Cypriots: 49%
   - Turkish Cypriots: 52%

2. Suspend the talks on reaching a comprehensive settlement and instead focus on measures to increase daily cooperation and build confidence between the two communities
   - Greek Cypriots: 47%
   - Turkish Cypriots: 50%

3. Suspend the talks for a few months pending elections in the Greek Cypriot community (Turkey) and in Turkey (the Greek Cypriot community) then resume with intensified talks
   - Greek Cypriots: 42%
   - Turkish Cypriots: 36%

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**Suspending the talks temporarily**

In both communities, responses to questions related to a potential suspension of the talks in case there is no progress by December demonstrated indecisiveness or intra-communal divisions.
If we reach the end of the year and no significant progress in the peace talks has yet been made, how would you evaluate each of the following options regarding next steps?

- **Continue with direct negotiations between the leaders of the two communities, under the auspices of the UN, until success is reached**: 83% Greek Cypriots, 60% Turkish Cypriots.

- **Continue talks between the two leaders only, without any UN or other international involvement, facilitation or contribution**: 43% Greek Cypriots, 56% Turkish Cypriots.

- **Move the process to a phase of UN arbitration, to finalise all aspects of the plan that were not agreed by the leaders**: 42% Greek Cypriots, 46% Turkish Cypriots.

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**Continuing the talks**

Majorities in both communities support a continuation of the peace talks under the current format, until success is reached. Additionally, it is preferred that the UN should continue playing a similar role as today, neither abandoning the process nor becoming an arbitrator.
If we reach the end of the year and no significant progress in the peace talks has yet been made, how would you evaluate each of the following options regarding next steps?

1. Move the process to an international conference, through which to resolve all pending issues
   - Greek Cypriots: 60%
   - Turkish Cypriots: 55%

2. Continue with broadened direct negotiations between the leaders of the two communities, by including representatives of Greece (Turkey), Turkey (Greece) and the EU in the talks
   - Greek Cypriots: 59%
   - Turkish Cypriots: 53%

3. Move the process of direct talks between the two leaders, to an intensive period of off-island negotiations
   - Greek Cypriots: 48%
   - Turkish Cypriots: 40%

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**Broadening the format of the talks**

Both communities in principle support moving the process to an international conference, or including other actors in the Cyprus-based peace talks. It may be worth exploring in future research more specific alternatives for the possible format of such broadened participation.
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