EXPOSURE TO PRO-RUSSIA MEDIA

UASCORE 2016 - 2018

Hypothesis:

1. What factors can serve as resilience factors against impact of Exposure to Pro-Russian media on Trust in Institutions?

Variables from Phase 1 & Phase 2
Panel sample: 6102
PRO- RUSSIA MEDIA CONSUMPTION:
PRO-EU ORIENTATION PREDICTIVE MODEL

Panel Sample: 6102
UASCORE 2016 & 2018

Pro-EU Orientation

Soviet Nostalgia
Empathy

Trust in Institutions
Perceived Service Delivery
Human Security

Exposure to Pro-Russia media
Pro-Russia orientation

Direct predictors
Indirect predictors
PRO-RUSSIA MEDIA CONSUMPTION:
HEATMAP 2018

Pro-Russia media consumption
The extent to which one is exposed to Russian media sources.

Zaporiz’ska has a positive correlation with ‘Exposure to Pro-Russia Media’, thus was not selected for further predictive analysis.
PRO-RUSSIA MEDIA CONSUMPTION:
RELATION TO TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS (REGRESSION)

- Services
- Pro EU orientation
- Political Security
- Personal Security
- Economical Security
- Perceived corruption
- Exposure to Pro Russia Media

Personal and political security doesn’t have a direct relationship with trust in institutions.

Controlled for Age, Education and Gender
Exposure to Pro-Russia Media

_CONTROLLED FOR_ Age, Education, and Gender

PRO-RUSSIA MEDIA CONSUMPTION: RELATION TO TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS (SEM MODEL)

- Services
- Political Security
- Pro-EU Orientation
- Perceived corruption

Trust in Institutions
PRO-RUSSIA MEDIA CONSUMPTION: RESILIENCE AND RISK FACTORS

**Resilience factor**
- Pro-human rights

**Vulnerability factor**
- Limited access to state services
- Weak human security

**Risk factors**
- Aggression
- Authoritarian values

Exposure to Pro-Russian Media

Trust in Institutions
PRO-RUSSIA MEDIA CONSUMPTION: NON SIGNIFICANT / NO DIRECT EFFECT ON THE FOLLOWING

- Executive Skills
- Family Coherence
- Social Skills
- Community Cooperation
- Social Tolerance
- Empathy
- Depression and self harm
- Psychosocial Adjustment Index

- Education
- Age
- Strength of civic initiatives
- Trust in media
- Multiculturalism experience
- Fatigue from conflict
- Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity
- Soviet Nostalgia
- Pro EU Orientation
ANNEX – EXPOSURE TO PRO-RUSSIA MEDIA
## Exposure to Pro-Russia Media:
### Descriptive Information per Oblast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exposed to Pro Russia Media with Trust in institutions correlations</th>
<th>Trust in institutions</th>
<th>Exposure to Pro Russia Media</th>
<th>Trust in national authorities</th>
<th>Trust in security services</th>
<th>Trust in local authorities</th>
<th>Trust in community</th>
<th>Trust in media</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donetska</strong> <em>(N=1052)</em></td>
<td>-0.129**</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.51</td>
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## Exposure to Pro-Russian Media: Descriptive Information Moderation

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<th></th>
<th>Pro Human rights</th>
<th>State services</th>
<th>Economic security</th>
<th>Personal security</th>
<th>Political security</th>
<th>Trait aggression</th>
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DOES PRO-RUSSIAN MEDIA HAS AN EFFECT ON BELIEF IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND TOLERANCE (BEYOND POLITICAL PREFERENCES)?

• For Eastern Ukraine low to no significant **correlations** between ‘Exposure to Pro Russia media’ with ‘Pro Human rights’ (r=.07*) or ‘Social Tolerance’ (r=-.01)

• In **regression** analysis ‘Exposure to Pro Russia media’ predict very poorly ‘Pro Human rights’ (β=.04 and r=.07), while it was not a significant predictor for Social Tolerance.

### Regional differences among the oblast that were selected for the moderation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Correlations</th>
<th>Exposure to Pro Russia Media</th>
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