Introduction

This White Paper presents evidence and makes recommendations for building a sustainable and effective Security Architecture for Cyprus, which draws on an integrative model for addressing security threats. When the concept of security is approached in a holistic way, there are better chances for reaching convergences on the security dossier. To foster sustainable peace, Cyprus will need to develop societal and institutional resilience, as well as readily available preventive and reactive remedies, in anticipation of post-settlement stressors. A United Nations mandated international hybrid mission would be needed in monitoring and verifying any transitional obligations. International support may also be needed for building and/or enhancing security-related capacities.

Despite the disappointment and fatigue across the island due to lack progress on Track 1, the two leaders are showing their shared political determination and will, demonstrated by the multi-party conference taking place at Crans Montana. Nonetheless, there is no denial that the two communities are finding it hard to overcome their diametrically opposed positions on the issue of security and guarantees. The political narratives across the divide have been polarized due to the different reasons and frustrations; this polarization and insecurities are resulting in growing resentment and apathy among the communities. Such an unforgiving socio-political climate on the island can undermine any innovative and constructive dialogue around security issues. The over-emphasis on third-party security guarantees acts as an obstacle to identifying institutions, mechanisms and processes that would enable a united Cyprus to build its own domestic capacities based on a shared understanding of security. Thus, broadening our understanding of security via independent and participatory research brings crucial added value for the peace process. Security Dialogue Initiative implemented by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) since October 2016 shares the following underlying objective:

To move away from win-lose security perceptions that feed from historical traumas and fears

To broaden and deepen the debate around security, to include human, economic, ontological and social aspects

To better understand and deliberate on the security needs, potential risks and threat perceptions of the communities

To collect and develop alternative security arrangements for these needs, threats, fears and risks and to test their viability and acceptability through inter-communal

To propose a new security architecture that can credibly address the security needs of all communities

Figure 1. Purpose and Rationale of the Security Dialogue Initiative.
Section 1. Principles for a New Security Architecture

1.1 Security architecture should effectively respond to actual and perceived threats.

An in-depth understanding of actual, as well as perceived threats, of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, is vital for addressing the challenges regarding to the security dossier. SeeD’s research shows that feelings of intergroup tension are strongly correlated with the support for the peace process for both communities. Other factors that predict support for the peace process are gender issues\(^1\) and specific sources of tension and conflict that relate to certain age groups. Thus, to ensure widespread, inclusive and strong support for the peace process, such underlying fears, tensions, mistrust and past traumas need to be addressed. The role of third states in the context of a settlement is another crucial element in the consideration of actual or perceived threats. Withdrawal of troops and territorial readjustments appear among the most challenging issues. Greek Cypriots tend to worry more about external and implementation security, with their second main worry being the functionality of the state. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots appear to worry more about constitutional and personal security and demand some kind of deterrence for preventing marginalization from the state institutions. While, Greek Cypriots’ greatest concern is the role of Turkey and federal functionality in the context of a settlement; Turkish Cypriots’ greatest concern regards the intentions of Greek Cypriots in relation to their political equality and effective participation in decision-making. They also appear to ask for some guarantees in the context of a settlement that would prevent non-compliance with the overall agreement.

\[\text{Feeling (in)secure in one's own self, the present & future}^{1}\]

\[\text{Personal (in)security}^{1}\]

\[\text{Economic (in)security}\]

\[\text{Community & Political (in)security}\]

\[\text{State & Regional (in)security}\]

Figure 2. An integrative model of (in)security as the basis for threat analysis

1.2 Preventive remedies are no less important than reactive remedies.

Current conversations primarily focus on reactive remedies and hard security (e.g. the number of troops and military guarantees). However, such mechanisms are heavily focused on responding to potential worst-case scenarios instead of preventing them from transpiring. A holistic perspective that integrates both preventive/‘soft’ and reactive/‘hard(er)’ security instruments is needed. Aforementioned tensions and fears within the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities show that focus should be shifted away from exclusive attention to reactive remedies and ‘hard security’ towards preventive remedies and ‘soft security’. This does not imply, however, that Security Architecture could ignore issues that relate to conventionally defined external threats and/or emerging new security challenges that entail hard security institutions and capabilities. What is being suggested instead is that there must be a complimentary, all-encompassing approach endorsed in relation to domestic security needs as well as regional/external security needs to address the identified concerns and fears expressed by both communities.

\(^1\) According to SCORE findings Cypriot women express more insecurities about the peace process and appear more skeptical of its prospects.
SeeD’s research has shown that when it comes to hard security formulas that focus solely on guarantees and military presence there is almost no room for convergence, since discussions get stuck on the involvement of Turkey (from the Greek Cypriot community’s perspective) and the fear of being marginalized and dominated by Greek Cypriots (from the Turkish Cypriot community’s perspective). The polarization of the two communities primarily lies in divergent ideas about ‘hard security’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government dysfunction &amp; socioeconomic inequalities</th>
<th>Social tensions &amp; political polarization</th>
<th>Isolated outbreaks of violence</th>
<th>Widespread violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 3. Sustaining Peace: Preventive vs. reactive security remedies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No unilateral intervention right, but in case of need, the parliament of the T/C constituent state would be able to call Turkey for help after all agreed remedies are</td>
<td>88% 4% 8%</td>
<td>56% 24% 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision of the Treaty of Guarantee, so that Turkey can only intervene in the northern part and Greece can only intervene in the southern part of the island.</td>
<td>79% 6% 15%</td>
<td>53% 28% 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee including unilateral intervention rights for 5 years after the solution, after which it will be cancelled.</td>
<td>76% 10% 14%</td>
<td>37% 27% 36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Guarantee cancelled after important parts of implementation have succeeded (e.g.s effective power sharing).</td>
<td>52% 13% 36%</td>
<td>26% 28% 46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full departure of all Greek and Turkish troops</td>
<td>13% 5% 83%</td>
<td>19% 29% 52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Less Secure | No Change | More Secure
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Figure 4. The tables above illustrate the GC and TC public opinion on various scenarios of ‘hard security’.
1.3 The security of one community should not lead to the insecurity of the other:

Security provisions and transitional security mechanisms should contribute to the sense of security of both communities. If a security remedy proposed by one community triggers insecurity to the other community, then perhaps it can be replaced by another remedy that is equivalent in meeting security needs but without negatively affecting the other community’s security. Remedies that build shared security will pave the way for resilience and sustainable peace.

1.4 Building endogenous resilience should be the ultimate goal.

Considering widespread concerns, among both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities, about functionality, sense of justice (including quotas) and the smooth implementation of a settlement, it is clear that needs and fears cannot sufficiently be addressed exclusively with a traditional ‘hard security’ approach. Approaches solely based on military arrangements, worst case scenarios or last resort formulas cannot tackle these needs and fears. Not only does a narrowly-defined traditional approach risk the sustainability of a new Federal system, it also provokes diminished support for the peace process and possibly the rejection of a comprehensive settlement plan by both/either of the communities, since public debate on worst case scenarios, exit clauses, and other deterrents lead to perception and expectations that the new system will be fragile, undermining trust and confidence in the viability and sustainability of an agreed settlement. Alternatively, focus must be shifted towards the construction of societal and institutional resilience, in order to create a sustainable and endogenous resilient state. Post-settlement, Cyprus must be able to function as a normal state, which tackles potential domestic institutional and societal stressors and contentions and addresses external and/or regional challenges and threats through its own means and capabilities and regional security collaborations. It is only expected that the new federal system may face frequent stressors and shocks in the initial period after the new state of affairs comes in to force. It is absolutely crucial to gear the transitional period towards building capacity and resources new federal institutions to ensure good governance and functionality so that they can efficiently and effectively address and absorb these stressors and shocks. When institutions respond to stressors, shocks and crisis effectively, efficiently and fairly, they do not only build their internal resilience and capacities but also foster civic loyalty. As a result, the federal state as a system becomes stronger and matures; in other words, it becomes endogenously resilient. On the other hand, when institutions fail to respond, or do not respond effectively and fairly, or when they collapse under stressors, shocks and crisis, they do not only exacerbate the feeling of insecurity but also undermine civic loyalty. As a result, the federal state as a system becomes weaker because the citizens lose confidence in it as a provider of security and they turn to non-state (e.g. para-militaries) or external actors (e.g. guarantors) as security providers; in other words, the state fails or becomes too fragile.
In the long run, a settlement can be sustained only if Federal Cyprus develops its own internal capacities to deal with stressors and threats. Thus, any security architecture should be designed in a way to foster confidence in the implementation, functionality and sustainability of an agreed settlement, and adopt endogenous societal and institutional resilience as its ultimate end goal. Resilience at the societal and institutional levels are of utmost importance and should be prioritized, so that in the event of stressors or shocks, (e.g., gridlock, perceived injustice or violence) state and civic institutions respond swiftly, effectively and fairly; and society underpins the institutional integrity and resilience by fostering trust and loyalties towards institutions:

Figure 5. Endogenous resilience vs. State Fragility.

Figure 6. Societal and Institutional Resilience will lead to an endogenous resilience.
The effectiveness, resilience and sustainability of proposed institutions can only be achieved if civic loyalty to the Federal state institutions is fostered rather than ethnic loyalty to one’s own community. Although community identities will remain important, they should, in no way, determine the functions of civil institutions:

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**Figure 7. Institutional loyalty vs. ethnic/community loyalty**

Community identities are cherished in society, but not permitted to influence the quality & inclusivity of service provision by Federal and Constituent State institutions.
Section 2. Revised Security Architecture

Building upon research findings and extensive feedback provided by national and international security experts and stakeholders, SDI team developed the New Security Architecture. Based on the aforementioned principles, the new architecture proposes mechanisms, institutions and policies that address the security needs and fears of the two communities by complementing reactive remedies with preventative remedies. The New Security Architecture aims to build strong and effective institutions that can respond to stressors, leading to increased civic loyalty and subsequently, a virtuous cycle of endogenous resilience rather than a vicious cycle of conflict and violence. This does not mean that there should be “no outside involvement” in the settlement, but rather all third party involvement and transitional arrangements should be geared towards supporting and strengthening endogenous resilience rather than undermining it by creating over-dependence on external security providers and by preventing internal mechanisms from maturing. The twelve preventative and reactive security elements proposed as per the New Security Architecture are listed below:
Internal and External ‘hard’ security elements, and elements of Regional Collaboration

As an independent and sovereign state, Federal Cyprus must be able to deal with external and regional security threats, and assume a constructive role in the region. Eastern Mediterranean is emerging as a challenging security conundrum, which involves some new security threats, emanating inter alia from terrorism, cybercrime, humanitarian crises, illicit trade, and etc. Thus, Cyprus will need to develop its own external security institutions and regional security collaborations, and pursue good relations and synergies with its regional neighbours on the basis of shared principles.

1. **Federal Security Council**: Brings together civil security and military security institutions (e.g. Minister of Defense, Director of Intelligence Services, Foreign Minister, Minister of Reconstruction and Social Cohesion, Minister of Interior, Director of Early Warning and Early Response System and etc.) to ensure collaboration towards a holistic comprehensive approach to security; Deals with any kind of internal and external security challenges and emergencies; Provides advice to the President, and other relevant law enforcement agencies; Collaborates with the Police and Joint Chiefs of Command for Federal Rapid Reaction Force and the Federal Naval and Air Defence Service).

2. **Federal Intelligence Service**: Collects intelligence vital for internal and external security pertinent to vital threats (terrorism, maritime, humanitarian, cyber, air defence); Builds cohesion and trust between Federal and constituent security institutions; and collaborates with third-state intelligence agencies.

3. **Federal Rapid Reaction Force (FRRF)**: Comprised of Cypriot personnel under joint command, the FRRF is responsible for asymmetric threats and domestic emergencies; Contributes to international missions (e.g. humanitarian, rescue and crisis management); Integrates best practices from other multi-communal security forces; Adopts an ethos of ‘shared security-shared responsibility’ and integrity policy among servicepersons. If necessary, the FRRF can be triggered to deal with emergencies through a distress call by Constituent State authorities.

4. **Federal Naval and Air Defense Service (FNAD)**: Comprised of Cypriot servicepersons from all communities, addresses regional security challenges and protects the external borders, airspace and offshore economic activities of Cyprus.

5. **Agreement on EEZ delineation and sharing of profits from natural gas exploitation**: A mutual agreement between Cyprus and Turkey should conclusively arrange the delineation of Cyprus’ EEZ vis-a-vis Turkey’s; and the sharing of profits from natural gas by the two Constituent States via the Federal Government to prevent tension and deadlock during the transition period and beyond.

6. **Governance/Constitutional security**

   6.1. Effective and communally-blind Police and Judiciary: This can be achieved through: a) Establishing mixed/bi-communal police units in addition to the Federal Police at the Constituent State and district level to respond to inter-communal incidents would address language barriers and perceived communal bias; b) Making it possible to challenge a judge on grounds of discrimination by appealing to a special chamber; c) Building on international monitoring of justice and civil security institutions during the transitional period to develop a culture of non-discrimination and communal blindness in the justice and security sector.

6.2. **Federal Commission on Human Rights & Gender Equality**: Monitors and audits Federal and Constituent State institutions to ensure that human rights are enjoyed by all; Reports infractions to prosecuting authorities; Liaises with specific institutions to help improve their practices; Recommends legislation; Promotes gender equality and mainstreaming (e.g., Adoption and implementation of a UNSCR1325 Agenda and Human Security proposal and
toolkit, supporting women’s participation in peacebuilding, and encouraging of gender diversity in decision-making).

8. Federal Public Administration Commission: Includes a Public Administration Academy, focused on promoting effectiveness, transparency and modernization of public institutions at all levels; Proposes legislation and other measures to combat corruption and nepotism; Adopts quotas to ensure the inclusion of women and young people in government; Adopts transparent public employment processes to improve sense of justice; Promotes bilingualism within public institutions; Organizes internal trainings for civil servants; and Provides capacity building and re-training of civil servants who will be transitioning into new public institutions (e.g. integration of ex-military personnel).

9. Ministry of Reconstruction and Social Cohesion: Ensures harmonious relations between communities by: a) monitoring the work of the Immovable Property Commission from a perspective of social and economic reconstruction, b) implementing a trust-building agenda through contact programs between members of different communities, c) coordinating and bridging institutions that would otherwise lack a Federal link, d) encouraging and supporting co-operation between professional associations of different communities (e.g., journalists, trade unions and etc., e) commissioning research into drivers of civic loyalty and political extremism, and f) monitoring the state of social and economic equality at the local community level, recommending appropriate remedial measures (e.g. EU Regional Funds, localized training programs, etc.).

10. Council of Unity and Cooperation: Is an inclusive advisory body: a) providing moral guidance in times of social tension and crisis, b) contributing to deadlock resolution and mediation in the Federal Government and c) exercising oversight during transition over the Ministry of Reconstruction and Social Cohesion. Council members would be selected through a method that ensures cross-communal support and mutual endorsement by both communities.

11. Early Warning / Early Response system (EWER): Detects emerging security threats domestically; Develops an effective preventive response, such as mediation, dialogue facilitation and multicultural education, in coordination with local authorities and other relevant institutions, including Federal and Constituent State Police when necessary; Prioritizes peaceful management of ‘contact hotspots’ where members of the two communities will be most likely to experience friction on a daily basis (e.g. territorially adjusted areas and communities with many returning IDPs). This system can be transitionally coordinated by a hybrid international organization (e.g. EU, UN) until its capacity can be transferred to the Federal Government.

_Implementation security_

12. Staged transition via an Agreed Implementation Framework: Clarifies the obligations of all sides, particularly regarding troop withdrawal and redeployment of Cypriot security forces, establishment of Federal institutions, power-sharing provisions, and territorial adjustments; Establishes a monitoring and auditing committee with third-party participation, verification mechanisms and milestones to address non-compliance; Include a pre-commitment to take unresolved implementation disputes to an international court or other mediation body; And be in line with international law, fully respecting the sovereignty and integrity of Cyprus.

Section 3. Security through unified institutions

The heat map below illustrates the strong island-wide support for various internal preventative security institutions built upon a sense of shared security and relating to governance and constitutional security. Seven out of ten Turkish Cypriots and eight out of ten Greek Cypriots express that unifying soft security institutions significantly increase their sense of security.

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2 Specific legal basis of the Implementation Framework (e.g. Treaty, Annex to the Comprehensive Settlement, Security Council Resolution) should be negotiated by the formal negotiating sides at the International Conference
Section 4. Special Transitional Arrangements (STAs):

In terms of the implementation of a settlement and of the suggested security architecture, there must be some STAs, as well as some benchmarks and verification mechanisms for each identified transitional period. Security Dialogue Initiative proposes the following STAs for the different transition phases:

Phase zero, the phase from a Formal Agreement until the date of a referendum, should aim to enhance implementation security, namely to generate confidence in all sides that the settlement will indeed be implemented as agreed.

Phase One, the phase from the date of a successful referendum until the coming into force of a new state of affairs, should aim to enhance constitutional and internal security, by preparing the Cypriot institutions and international support mechanisms needed on Day One of the Settlement’s implementation.

Phase Two should aim to consolidate constitutional and internal security through institutional capacity building and nurturing social cohesion and should include a small STA package scheduled to expire when key implementation benchmarks are met, and subject to a final approval by the Senate. A hybrid international mission including UN, EU and OSCE would play a vital role under this phase in providing external support to transitionally address potential security vacuums. This mission would support the establishment and build capacity of rule of law institutions, monitor the faithful implementation of all settlement provisions, advise in case of challenges, supervise ‘hotspots’ and areas under territorial adjustment, mediate disputes to prevent the build-up of tension, and establish and operate the EWER until it can be fully transferred to the Federal government.

During Phase Three all Cypriot communities will be able to live together under prevailing conditions of security, which will be provided by effective and resilient Federal and Constituent State institutions. All these institutions will, of course, have been functioning for several years already. What will be different at this stage is that external support and STAs will have been removed, as Cypriots reach a state of mature civic loyalty towards the institutions of Cyprus.
About SeeD and the Security Dialogue Initiative

Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) is a Brussel based international think-tank that implements the “Security Dialogue Initiative” (SDI) together with its international partners, Interpeace and the Berghof Foundation. SDI was launched in October 2016. As an independent, scientific and participatory research project, SDI aims to support the Cyprus Peace Process by researching, understanding and formulating solutions for the security needs of the two main communities in Cyprus and the potential risks that may arise during and post-transition period.

The first phase of the research employed qualitative methods that included 11 thematic focus groups with the grassroots, over 20 interviews with policy makers and elites, and open dialogue and consultation with local and international security experts. The key output of the first phase was to prepare a comprehensive threat and risk analysis.

The second phase included a quantitative opinion poll based on a representative random sample of 3000 people, 1500 from each community. The key purpose of the second face is to test the viability and acceptability of alternative security formulas.

The third phase of the research focused on building the New Security Architecture for a Federal Cyprus based on the findings. This proposed New Security Architecture was then revised and fine-tuned based on a comprehensive reflection and validation process. To that end the Security Dialogue Initiative organised through 6 focus groups, numerous reflection and dialogue meetings, presentations and an expert vetting exercise where both national and international experts provided their critiques, insights and feedback.