Abstract

The present paper seeks to examine the security aspect of a post-settlement Federal Cyprus. Among other things, the paper assesses the current external security environment of Cyprus in order to identify and prioritize certain security challenges, and analyses four security areas that may pose threats or challenges to the external relations or domestic stability of post-settlement Cyprus. It is argued that a secure and politically stable Federal Cyprus will first and foremost need a reliable political system with functioning decision-making mechanisms in order to pursue a coherent and effective foreign and security policy without crisis-producing deadlocks; the very political system will be its best “guarantor”. Lastly, targeted actions, a number of which are proposed, should be undertaken as soon as possible for the development of a federal security culture – i.e. convergence of communal interests and preferences – which will allow for joint strategic formulation and the development of a common sense of direction in the various policy areas of the federal state.
1 Introduction

Over the past couple of years the peace process in Cyprus has gradually entered a new and crucial phase. The positive momentum that has developed both internationally and between the leaders of the two communities is arguably unprecedented. For this reason, hopes and expectations have been growing, despite the occasional setbacks. A good degree of the substantial negotiation chapters has been covered, important convergences between the two sides have been reached, and the process seems to be moving on to its final stages. However, it is expected that these final stages will also prove to be the most difficult ones as the involved parties will have to deal with the most sensitive issues of the Cyprus Problem such as the chapters of Territory and Security-Guarantees.

It could be argued that the chapter of Security and Guarantees is the most important one. On the one hand because it is related to perceptual-psychological issues in the two communities that are linked with negative historical experiences, and on the other hand because the viability and sustainability of a settlement may depend on it. Furthermore, it is important that any post-settlement security arrangements and the political system itself will take into account the troubled history of the island and inter-communal relations as well as its volatile external geopolitical environment.

Against this background, the present paper seeks to examine the security aspect in the context of a post-settlement Federal Cyprus. We are particularly concerned about the implications of the regional security environment for Cyprus in terms of its external relations, security policies and their linkage to domestic stability and power relations. In this respect, there is a need to envision and factor in the post-settlement domestic dynamics in conjunction with geopolitical and security challenges, at least as seen from today’s point of view. Within this framework we need to prioritize some security challenges and calculate the potential risk. At times, the results of this exercise may seem exaggerated or far-fetched. Yet the aim is precisely to devise ways of pre-empting challenges and threats that may put the security and political stability of a Federal Cyprus in danger.

The paper starts by conceptualizing national security, interests and foreign policy in the context of a post-settlement Cyprus, especially as regards the “relationship” between the interests and preferences of the two communities within a federal system – which may prove challenging. We then review the current external security environment of Cyprus in order to identify and prioritize certain security challenges that stem from it. In the following section we analyse four security areas that may pose security threats or challenges to the external or domestic relations of post-settlement Cyprus. These areas have to do with international relations, issues of sovereignty, energy security and policy, and aspects of migration and terrorism.

Finally, we explore some ideas that we think should be seriously considered while moving forward in the peace process. A secure and politically stable Federal Cyprus will first and foremost need a reliable political system with functioning decision-making mechanisms in order to pursue a coherent and effective foreign and security policy without crisis-producing deadlocks. In this sense the very political system will be the best “guarantor” of a post-settlement Cyprus. Lastly, targeted actions should be undertaken as soon as possible for the development of a federal security culture – i.e. convergence of interests and preferences – which will allow joint strategic formulation and a common sense of direction in the various policy areas of the federal state.
2 Conceptual Framework: National Security, Interests and Foreign Policy

The concept of national security has been traditionally associated with power and a particular – rather narrow – understanding of peace. In the context of the Cold War, the dominant notion was that national security could be acquired via the maximization of a nation’s power. Alternatively, national security was seen as “a consequence of peace,” which was often defined as the absence of war (Buzan 1983). From this perspective, national security, national interest and foreign policy (or diplomacy) are inextricably linked to each other. As Hans Morgenthau (1948, p. 528) put it at the wake of the Cold War:

*The national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, and national security must be defined as integrity of national territory and of its institutions. National security, then, is the irreducible minimum which diplomacy must defend without compromise and even at the risk of war.*

Although one could argue that this conceptualization of national security and national interest is in some respects still dominant, it is undeniable that the academic and political debates around these issues have come a long way at least since the late years of the Cold War. Partly because of the end of bipolarity and partly because globalization has reached new levels in recent years, our understanding of security is nowadays much more developed and complex. Seen through this prism, national security cannot merely be about the threat or the absence of war. A host of other security threats have come into the spotlight even as the concept of security acquired a human dimension as well (e.g. Baldwin 1997; Buzan 1997; Tziarras 2014; Ullman 1983; Wæver 1993). In other words, the (nation) state is not the sole object of analysis in terms of security; attention is also being paid to the security of individuals, various social and political groups, the environment, economy and so on. By extension, security threats range from poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation to terrorism, migration and crime (UN 2004).

Given that the concept of national security has been largely redefined overtime, the concept of national interest should follow suit. The “national” should be unpacked: when we refer to national-state interest we do not only refer to the pursuit of integrity in terms of territory and institutions. Rather we more generally refer to “perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state” which, in the context of a democratic political system, should at least partly reflect the public interest (Nuechterlein 1976). The public interest is, in turn, affected by a number of historical, economic, demographic, political, ideational and psychological factors. If the national, public and individual interests are intertwined in a state’s decision-making processes, what happens when there is considerable divergence and fragmentation in socio-political values, norms and principles; namely, when different segments of the society define their interests in very – even radically – different terms?

*“National” Security and Interests in a Federal Cyprus*

To envision national security and national interest in a future Federal Cyprus is to dwell on precisely this challenge. **How could two communities (the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot) who have lived apart for so long due to ethnic conflict come together under the same government and take joint decisions on issues as sensitive as national security?** If we are to look at ethnic conflicts as the conflicts in which “the goals [and therefore the interests] of at least one party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line is one of ethnic divisions” (Cordell & Wolff 2010, p. 5),
then the gap of interests between the two communities, more than five decades after the first ethnic clashes, becomes even more unbridgeable – at least in the short term.

Each community has developed its own set of interests, more often than not defined along ethnic lines and against each other – via a process of “othering” (Said 1979). In this sense, each community’s identity\(^1\) is a source of distinct ideologies and therefore of different political and security preferences (Fieden 1999). As Peter Katzenstein (1996, p. 23) argues, “the international and domestic societies in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways. The state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors.” The prospect of a Federal Cyprus should thus be analysed against this background, for in such a scenario the “national” would be fragmented and comprised of two ethnic groups, namely two different “nationals”. Hence it is highly likely that competing interests and preferences will develop within the joint decision-making mechanisms.

One of Federal Cyprus’ greatest challenges would, therefore, be to reframe the interests of each community into “national” interests, that is, federal state interests. Failure to do so will have various implications, potentially including domestic instability and decision-making deadlocks in terms of national security and foreign policy preferences (Tziarras 2013). Importantly, these are matters pertaining to the competencies of the central federal government (not the federated/constituent states) for which members of both communities will have to agree on – e.g. foreign policy, security policy, energy policy, etc. The prolongation of such a volatile state of affairs or failure to pre-empt and prevent these possibilities could well reverse the process of post-agreement normalization and lead inter-communal relations back to the stage of contradiction and polarization; a recipe that often results in escalation and even violent conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2005).

Having these prospects and challenges in mind, the rest of the paper identifies some of the most important regional security problems that Federal Cyprus could be faced with given the current geopolitical context. It then analyses four issue areas that will be of crucial importance for the foreign policy and national security of Federal Cyprus. More specifically, these issue areas have to do with external security challenges to Cyprus, be they in terms of security threats or foreign relations, which could however greatly affect Cyprus’ domestic political processes, as demonstrated thus far in this section. As such, the analysis of each issue area will: a) lay out the specifics of the external challenge at hand and b) scrutinize the linkage between external security imperatives and domestic politics in a federal context.

---

\(^1\) Of course this is not to say that there are not any common elements between the two. Quite the contrary is the case, at least on the level of social relations and some cultural traditions.
3 The External Security Context

The perception of what is recognized as a security problem and who can define it has undergone a notable transformation in the Mediterranean after the Arab Spring in 2011 (Bauer 2015). The Mediterranean security landscape is marked by increased regional insecurity which resulted from regime change in a number of states, containment of political unrest in many of the states, upsurge in Islamic tendencies, and worsening of economic conditions (Inbar 2013). Against this backdrop of interlocking developments, security in the Eastern Mediterranean can be observed within a framework of transition. In other words, as Litsas and Tziampiris (2015) describe, the inter-state relations in the region are in a flux. Civil war in Syria is continuing with serious humanitarian, economic, and security consequences (Pierini 2016). States are in fragile and unstable conditions, there is a possibility of de facto (or even de jure) border change in some part of the Eastern Mediterranean, and political Islam and sectarian tensions reached hazardous levels where Jihadist terrorism is posing noteworthy threats to the security of the region (Dokos 2016). Furthermore, economic inequality, democratic deficit, and previously existing regional conflicts are rendering the security of the region even more fragile. Considering also the lack of a regional security architecture and a relative decline in U.S. interest and presence in the region (Dokos 2016), the Eastern Mediterranean can be depicted as highly volatile. Consequently, a great deal of research has focused on the ways in which foreign policy orientations and alliances need to be reformulated in the region (Altunışık 2011; Codner 2011; Cropsey 2015; Davutoğlu 2010; Dokos 2012; Inbar 2013; Kirişçi 2009; Lesser 2005; Mavroyiannis 2014; Midkiff 2012; Nopens 2013; Novo 2014; Öğürlü 2012, 2013; Öğütçü 2011; Sitilides 2014; Turan, 2011; Tziarras 2015b).2

Following the natural gas discoveries, energy security and energy policies in the Eastern Mediterranean have risen to the forefront of the regional affairs and a substantial deal of work has concentrated on the energy and security nexus in this fashion (Adamides & Christou 2015; Bryza 2013; Colombo et al. 2016; Darbouche et al. 2012; El-Katiri & El-Katiri 2014; Faustmann et al. 2012; Giannakopoulos 2016; Good 2014; Gürel et al. 2013; Holland 2015; Shaffer 2014).3 Studies generally evolve around the role energy discoveries may play in creating grounds for cooperation in the region (El-Katiri 2016; Roberts 2013; Sartori et al. 2016; Tagliapietra & Mattei 2012). Discovery of energy resources in the region also resurfaced another crucial matter: the delineation of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the Eastern Mediterranean. Security concerns in the region can thus also be viewed from the prism of political boundaries where the failure of delimitation of these boundaries creates sites of

---


division, fragmentation and political conflicts mostly in the case of delimitation of EEZs. Talking more specifically about Cyprus, Eissler and Arasýl (2014), argue that oil and natural-gas reserves have made EEZ more significant, thus political problems surrounding Cyprus are likely to persist longer.

As seen above, the interconnectedness of the security dilemmas in the region is an evident phenomenon and unfortunately the regional security challenges are not limited to inter-state relations, border disputes, and energy security concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean. Migration can be regarded as one of the most important security issues for the region, where the Eastern Mediterranean is increasingly becoming a buffer between the immigrants and their anticipated destinations in Europe (Ceccorulli & Labanca 2014). Heinitz (2013) indicates the intensive securitization of EU’s external borders in the face of migration flows in the region from the mid-2000s. With a Cypriot focus, Gorvett (2016) points out the centrality of Cyprus as a key player in tackling migration as a regional security problem. Gvosdev (2013) likewise implies the link between Cyprus and international terrorism which is another important regional security challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is certainly important to address the security of Federal Cyprus within the regional security context drawn above. In that sense, it is essential to note that the notion of foreign policy is a crucial attribute of the sovereign state and an intrinsic dimension of national security. Pursuing a coherent, consistent and efficient foreign policy can be complicated for Federal Cyprus as a foreign policy actor amidst the tough security challenges that have entered the regional agenda in recent years. This can mostly be the result of lack of mutual interests in the case of Cyprus where laying down general directions and priorities for implementation of foreign policy can be difficult. Problems experienced by other federal structures of similar nature can be informative in that respect. Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, can be viewed as a relevant case which can guide us in approaching the case of Cyprus. This is mainly because in both cases federalism is not the result of a long tradition of autonomy, regionalism and decentralization. It is rather the outcome of the attempts of international community to create power-sharing mechanisms and preserve territorial integrity (Bahçeli & Noel 2005). The stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina is extremely fragile at the current stage, mostly as a result of the semi-autonomous Republika Srpska for secession (Economist 2016). Furthermore, on critical matters such as the membership of NATO, the direction of the country is determined at the entity level instead of the national government level (Haltzel 2014). This situation creates foreign policy splits in Bosnia and threatens the chance for the multi-ethnic future of the country and the stability of the region.

In a similar vein, the security of Federal Cyprus is equally bound to the regional outlook of cooperation and conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean and its own integrity. In that sense, given the pivotal role played by power and interest and strategic decision-making in the region in determining the broader dynamics of securities and insecurities, it is important to establish the ways in which these security challenges are related to the Cypriot context. In view of that, the existing literature above on regional cooperation and alliances, the issue of sovereignty, border delimitations, and international law, energy security and energy policy, internal political instability, and other points of concern (e.g.

---

terrorism, migration) are viewed as intrinsically related to the security of Federal Cyprus in the medium and long term and deserve more detailed scrutiny as individual cases.

4 Cyprus in the Context of Regional Security

Against the background of the regional geopolitical environment and the various challenges it poses to security and inter-state relations, we look at four scenarios that could potentially affect Federal Cyprus’ foreign and security policies in a direct or indirect way. The four scenarios regard: a) the general security and foreign policy orientation of Federal Cyprus; b) issues of sovereignty and International Law, particularly as expressed in the case of Exclusive Economic Zones; c) federal energy security and energy policy; and d) asymmetric threats such as (irregular) migration and political extremism.

Each case is examined on the basis of the current (pre-solution) preferences and interests in the two communities. A context is provided for each scenario that covers its various dynamics and dimensions, particularly the external ones. Then for each case study the implications and effects on the foreign and security policy of Federal Cyprus are covered under the sub-section Policy-Making Challenges in a Post-Settlement Context. This allows for the identification of core problems and for the development of suggestions in terms of what could be done, as put forth in the section that follows.

4.1 International Relations and Security Policy

The international outlook of a country is a highly important issue that largely affects all the dimensions of its foreign policy and international relations more generally. The international outlook and position of Cyprus has long been subject of debate, as is the case with other states of the region like Turkey and even Greece. Because of their geographical position at the intersection between Europe and the (Middle) East they are often seen as a (potential) bridge between East and West. This is of course a mostly geopolitical discussion since all three states are at least institutionally parts of the West; Greece and Turkey are NATO members while Cyprus and Greece are also members of the EU.

However the international system has in recent years become much more complex (Schweller 2014). As American global hegemony is undergoing reconfiguration and new powers are on the rise (Zakaria 2011), dualisms such as “West vs East” are gradually becoming obsolete. Because of this it has become more difficult for smaller states (e.g. small and middle powers) to determine and decide on their international positioning and outlook. This applies to the cases of both Greece and Turkey. To NATO’s concern the former is increasingly flirting with Russia (Stanek 2016) while Turkey has been gradually drifting away from the West at least partially since the mid-2000s. The more recent example are Ankara’s problematic relations with NATO as well as its growing interest in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the “Eastern” bloc more generally, namely BRICS, as opposed to an EU membership (Bacik 2013; Wang 2016).

Though a member-state of the EU, the Republic of Cyprus is not over these foreign policy dilemmas either. This is not to say that Cyprus is turning away from the West, but a domestic debate about its further integration into it – e.g. via a membership in Partnership for Peace or even NATO – is still ongoing (Tziarras 2015a). For its part, the Turkish-Cypriot Community (TCC) is eager to become integrated into the EU through the settlement of the Cyprus Problem; the EU itself has undertaken a
number of capacity-building and harmonization projects in view of such a potential (EU 2016; Kyris 2015). Yet Turkey’s political and economic leverage over the community complicates things as it often poses obstacles to or overpowers the Turkish-Cypriot will, despite the fact that Ankara strongly supports the Turkish-Cypriot positions in the peace negotiations. For instance, the deteriorating Turkish-EU relations and Turkey’s recent domestic instability have brewed fears within TCC that, due to lack of incentives for Ankara and its shift in orientation, the chance for a settlement may once again slip away (Murray 2016).

This framework of geopolitical dynamics, international relations and interests allows us to develop some hypothetical but plausible worst-case scenarios and make certain projections in terms of challenges that may arise in post-settlement Cyprus. Such an approach will help us identify potential problems that could hinder Federal Cyprus’ foreign and security policies as well as its domestic stability. These scenarios relate to issues such as relations with the EU, prospects to enter NATO and foreign affairs more generally.

**Policy-Making Challenges in a Post-Settlement Context**

Given the recent Turkish foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis Syria, Iraq, the EU and beyond, it would not be far-fetched to assume that Turkey – in one way or the other – will not honour any settlement agreement reached on the Cyprus Problem. And it could do so in a number of ways. It could for example deny the withdrawal of Turkish troops in part or in whole just like it could, depending on the provisions of the agreement, refuse to carry out the reinstatement of a number of Turkish migrants back to Turkey.

In this case Federal Cyprus, or at least the Greek-Cypriot constituent state, would want to somehow protest. One way of doing that would be to apply pressures through the EU, maybe by freezing certain negotiation chapters of Turkey’s accession process or blocking the opening of new ones. This would be a foreign policy decision, which means there would have to be a consensus between both of the constituent states, the Greek-Cypriot (GC) and Turkish-Cypriot (TC). However, there is a good chance that the TC constituent state will not want to follow such a policy for two reasons: a) because Turkey’s refusal might be convenient for the constituent state or some of its citizens, and b) because it would not want to undermine its relations with Turkey, for that would probably be followed by other repercussions, economic or others. The result would be the clear manifestation of two different pre-existing sets of “national” interests and preferences that would lead to a decision-making deadlock and, by extension, to political tension – or even a crisis – between the two constituent states.

Another scenario, associated with the overall orientation of Federal Cyprus, could be the issue of NATO or, simply, Cyprus’ relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. There is a general mistrust towards NATO in both communities (Ker-Lindsay 2008; OmadaKypros 2015) but it is very likely that accession into NATO will be pursued after a settlement, at least by some political powers in Cyprus. In spite of Turkey’s reaction, which has so far been against such a prospect (Acikmese & Triantaphyllou 2012), this might again create friction especially if political processes in the two constituent states remain disconnected. Potential Turkish-Cypriot pursuit of NATO accession might stumble on Greek-Cypriot

---

5 Turkey has recently intervened militarily in Syria against the will of the Syrian government; it maintains a military brigade in the city of Basiqa, near Mosul, in Iraq despite strong protest by the Iraqi government; and it disputes the legitimacy and content of the Treaty of Lausanne which determined national borders in the region after World War I. At the same time, Turkish politicians stated that a recent non-binding resolution by the European Parliament suggesting the temporary freezing of Turkey’s EU accession had “no importance” and “no value at all” (Rankin 2016).
denial, especially if left-wing AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People; Greek: Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού, Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazomenou Laoú; Turkish: Emekçi Halkın İlerici Partisi) remains a prominent political power in the Greek-Cypriot constituent state.

Finally, decision-making problems may also arise between the two constituent states if Turkey continues to have troubled relations with other states of the region that Cyprus cooperates with. That is, if the settlement of the Cyprus Problem does not contribute to the resolution of problems between, for example, Turkey-Greece and Turkey-Egypt, the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state, incentivized by Turkey, might oppose relations that the Republic of Cyprus had already developed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thereby, Cyprus could end up becoming a “proxy” in Turkey’s antagonism with Greece, Egypt or other states of the region in the future with direct implications for its external security as well as its domestic political stability.

4.2 Sovereignty and International Law

In the context of contemporary regional geopolitics where problems related with the demarcation of boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute notable sources of tension, potential territorial disputes will certainly have implications for Federal Cyprus’s foreign and security policies. Issues such as physical demarcations of borders, territorial claims, nationalism, and statehood have been at the top of foreign and security policy agendas as they are all vital for the very existence of states. As David Newman (cited in Emmers 2010) explains, “territorial fixation remains one of the major legacies of the Westphalian state system” thus far. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Syrian civil war, and the Lebanon-Israel dispute over maritime borders are some of the issues which are related with the problematic nature of sovereignty and territorial claims in the region.

These matters would have certain effects on the foreign and security policy of Federal Cyprus since they will continue to influence and shape the regional (in)stability in which the island will find itself after a settlement. Nevertheless, there is one concern related to sovereignty and territorial claims which is directly linked to the potential insecurity of Cyprus both in a transition and in a post-settlement context: maritime territorial disputes (Zhukov 2013). As Sözen (2014) argues, the hydrocarbon exploration crisis between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on the one hand and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) on the other, resulted in expanding the Cyprus dispute to a new regional arena which deserves further attention.

Territorial, natural resource and power considerations can be viewed as interconnected variables influencing geopolitics and maritime territorial disputes in the region, particularly between Turkey and the RoC. Hence, the reading of the role of these key attributes of geopolitics in regional security relations may serve to understand how sovereignty, borders and international law operate and interact across the issues of regional security and Cyprus. Following the events of 1963 in Cyprus which resulted in the de facto disappearance of the bi-communal governmental structure of the 1960 RoC, the international community continued to view the Greek-Cypriot government as the single legitimate government in the island (Özersay 2004-2005). This has been the main source of ambiguity with regard to the boundaries and territorial claims in Cyprus. Moreover since 1974, the island is de facto partitioned with the ‘Green Line’ becoming a contested boundary in flux (Peristianis & Mavris 2012). Klaus Dodds (in Emmers 2010, p. 10) notes that “boundaries are central to the discourse of sovereignty as they provide, among other
things, the means for a physical and cultural separation of one sovereign state from another.”6 Hence, RoC’s right to sign agreements with coastal states of the Mediterranean Sea for the delimitation of its maritime boundaries has been disputed by Turkey (Collinsworth 2012).

Turkey maintains that until the settlement of disputed maritime boundaries with the Greek Cypriots, drillings should not take place in the region and any profits from the oil and gas drillings should benefit the whole of Cyprus. The RoC, on the other hand, holds that it has the legal right to explore for gas as a sovereign state and that whatever findings will belong to all Cypriots.7 The way sovereignty concerns were expressed in the Cyprus gas issue escalated tensions in the region even further when Turkey sent a vessel to carry out seismic explorations for oil and gas inside the RoC’s claimed maritime zone in October 2014. Furthermore, the parties cannot be involved in direct negotiations concerning the resolution of their overlapping claims since Turkey does not recognize the RoC. Turkish Cypriots also view their legitimate rights and interests to be under threat and question the RoC’s actions with regards to the concluding of agreements with third countries for the EEZ delimitation or for joint development of cross-boundary resources. In the same vein, Turkish Cypriots argue that granting licences for hydrocarbon prospecting and exploration, and authorizing exploration and drilling operations offshore, Cyprus should wait until a settlement is reached (Gürel et al. 2013).

These actions are considered to be an exercise of sovereign rights at the international level without the involvement of the Turkish-Cypriot Community, an otherwise equal community according to the 1960 constitution of the RoC (ibid.). It is seen that hydrocarbons-related actions by the RoC highly intersect with issues of territoriality. In other words, existing conflictual positions resurfaced in the maritime territorial dispute in the Cypriot context.

The search for and acquirement of energy resources is regulated by International Law, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), especially in terms of the explorations for natural resources in disputed offshore maritime areas of Cyprus. Neither Turkey nor the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared any EEZ where the RoC delimitated its EEZ with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007), and Israel (2010). Against this backdrop, Turkish Cypriots consider the lack of joint explorations and development schemes at the current stage as a disregard of their rights and interests. In relation to that, the next part aims to discuss a wide range of policy-making challenges the Federal Cyprus may face in the domain of sovereignty and international law.

**Policy-Making Challenges in a Post-Settlement Context**

A political settlement of the Cyprus problem will ease the tensions of the maritime dispute between Turkey and the RoC and will provide the necessary mechanisms for joint exploration and development schemes for the two communities in Cyprus. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that disputes over sovereignty will be largely resolved in the context of a Federal Cyprus. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, Turkey’s continental shelf claims fundamentally clash with the continental shelf and proclaimed EEZ of the RoC and also relate to the Aegean dispute between Turkey and Greece. Negotiations with Turkey over the maritime borders of the island will become a top priority.

---

6 For a similar conceptual framework on geopolitics and maritime territorial disputes see Emmers 2010 itself.
7 In relation to that point, former president of the RoC Christofias said, “once again, I would like to underline to all those who attempt to question this right of the Republic of Cyprus: The sovereign rights of our country are not negotiable” (“Cyprus says right to drill,” 2011). See also ‘Cyprus says right to drill for gas ‘non-negotiable’. (30 September 2011). Reuters. Retrieved from www.reuters.com/article/cyprus-turkey-gas-idUSL5E7KU2VG20110930.
for Federal Cyprus and a major regional challenge at the same time. This is mainly because the two
toentities in Federal Cyprus may hold differing perspectives with regard to the matter at hand.

Turkish Cypriots may pursue a policy more aligned with the Turkish interests and argue for the
“equity principle” while delimiting maritime borders in the region. This may fundamentally clash with
the Greek Cypriot perspective which is primarily based on the median line method. Considering the fact
that all delimitation agreements signed between the RoC and other states so far are based on the median
line method, Turkey’s probable insistence on “equity principle” may complicate the whole picture in the
region. Fundamentally differing positions as such can threaten the security environment after a
settlement. Hence, to avoid competing claims over maritime delimitation at later stages, agreeing on
clear definitions of EEZ and Continental Shelf as concepts can be seen as a necessary step within the
framework of a settlement. Postponing the issue will render the post-settlement context more fragile and
more inclined to crisis at the same time.

4.3 Energy Security and Energy Politics

Given the risks and requirements of energy security in the twenty-first century, energy needs are
influential in determining the foreign policy objectives of states. Cyprus is not an exception to that.
Energy security is defined as the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices. The physical
security of infrastructure, supply chains and trade routes, the ability of developing and acquiring energy
supplies, formulating national policies and designing international institutions to respond to
disruptions of the steady flow of supplies and being able to invest in adequate supplies and
infrastructure are all different dimensions of energy security (Yergin 2011). Considering the issue of
interdependence in the sector of energy, Yergin (2011, ch. 13) explains that “energy security is not just
about countering the wide variety of threats; it is also about the relations among nations, how they
interact with each other, and how energy impacts their overall national security”. Hence, Cyprus’s
energy security and energy policy framework needs to be viewed within the broader theme of regional
energy cooperation and conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean. The changing energy landscape in the
region, the prospective regional markets for gas, the Eastern Mediterranean’s potential
contribution to the EU’s energy needs, and energy security in the wider global context are some
of the factors influencing Cyprus’s energy security and energy policy in general (Tziarras 2015c).

The Tamar reserve off Israel’s coast, which has an estimated 10 tcf of gas, and Leviathan with an
estimate of 22 tcf, fundamentally reshaped the energy landscape in the region. The discovery of
approximately 5 tcf of gas in the Aphrodite reserve, Cyprus offshore block 12, added another excitement
to the gas scene of the region (Gürel & Mullen 2014). Another new discovery, the “Zohr” field in Egypt’s
EEZ, was made in August 2015 and is estimated to retain 30 tcf of gas (“Eni discovers a supergiant”, ENI
2016). Further explorations can be viewed as a source of hope for new findings which could
substantially alter the energy landscape of the region. Although no further explorations have taken
place in Israel due to the antitrust disagreement between Noble and Delek and the government, the
issue is now settled namely with the gas outline.

International firms are expected to show an interest in Israel’s offshore reserves, certainly the ones
who will not be deterred by the possibility of negative repercussions in their relations with Arab
countries. Despite of equally noteworthy political obstacles, Cyprus launched its own bid round in July
US’s ExxonMobil, Qatar’s QP, Italy’s Eni, and France’s Total are now involved in RoC’s EEZ hydrocarbon explorations. Total is planning to drill in Block 11 and Eni is also to drill two more wells across Blocks 2, 3, and 9 by February 2018* (“East Med Bidding”, MEES 2016). Due to the overlap between the continental shelf claimed by Turkey and the RoC blocks that have been licensed out in the south-west of the island, both Block 10 and Block 6 are disputed. These blocks are viewed by Turkey as in potential Turkish continental shelf/EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Depending on the circumstances, 2017 is critical in terms of Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis developments in these disputed blocks.

The development of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean certainly depends on the feasibility and viability of its commercialization. Current low gas prices in both Asia and Europe are expected to remain at these levels for the foreseeable future (Ellinas 2016). In terms of prospective regional markets, Turkey could – commercially speaking – be a good option for Eastern Mediterranean producers due to its relatively high gas prices and close proximity. In a global context, possibly vast shale oil and gas resources and the development of renewables are providing alternatives at lower costs. This is to say, ample supplies and continuous energy demand are expected to result in low oil and gas prices for a conceivable future (Ellinas 2016). It is seen that the future of the Eastern Mediterranean gas is largely bound to these global challenges.

**Policy-Making Challenges in a Post-Settlement Context**

In the context of energy security, Federal Cyprus will face policy-making challenges with regard to different preferences for export options and licensing contracts for the exploration and exploitation of natural gas off-shore Cyprus. In other words, there may be conflict of interests and a policy split on that crucial matter. Greek Cypriots may prefer either the LNG (liquefied natural gas) option, mainly because it gives more room for flexibility, or the “EastMed Pipeline” which was selected by the European Commission as a Project of Common Interest (PCI). The proposed pipeline intends to connect Eastern Mediterranean resources to Greece and Italy via Cyprus and Crete. Although most experts agree that the project is not cost effective, it is politically more viable for Greek Cypriots. As understood, this project does not include Turkey into the energy cooperation scheme, and as a result of that Turkish Cypriots may contend and prefer sending gas to Turkey and from there to Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor. This can be seen as a commercially more viable option, though the political risk has admittedly grown of late.

Moreover, the revival of the Turkish Stream could obstruct the expansion of Southern Gas Corridor and this would create certain difficulties for Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean gas flows. Nevertheless, primarily for political reasons, Turkish Cypriots may continue to seek the ways in which this project can be realized. FCNG or FLNG would be considered as alternative options in a similar vein (Ellinas 2016) but none of the parties showed any specific interest in these options. It is likely that in the context of Federal Cyprus, they will remain to be seen as remote options largely due to their high costs. On the other hand, even if the two entities agree on sending the Cypriot gas along with that of Israel to Egypt to be liquefied at the two idle LNG plants of Idku and Damietta for export to European markets, within the context of low gas prices, this will not be able to compete with Russian gas prices (Cunningham 2016).

*Eni’s license will expire by that date.*
Thus, in the most likely scenario, this would not be considered as a tangible alternative for Federal Cyprus.

As a result, Federal Cyprus is likely to face a real challenge in developing a coherent energy policy given the interplay of numerous variables as mentioned above. In an environment where Egypt is moving forward to develop the Zohr field, it can be said that Cyprus and Israel are facing more limited export options. Thus when both political and commercial factors are brought together it is seen that although the EU supports potential pipeline and LNG import routes for the Eastern Mediterranean for the moment, broader political instability in the region, gas prices and the existence of Russia as a strong competitor, all need to be taken into account while drafting a development strategy for Federal Cyprus’ gas reserves. Given the likely policy splits, it will certainly be a puzzling process.

## 4.4 (Irregular) Migration, Ideological Threats, and Political Extremism

Two of the most important asymmetric threats of the 21st century, which are related to issues of ideology as well, are (irregular) migration and political extremism (or terrorism). The post-9/11 world has seen a dramatic rise in Islamic terrorism, migration and refugee waves due to the conflict and geopolitical instability of the Middle East, among other things. In the 2010s this situation was further exacerbated first with the outbreak of the Arab uprisings and then with the emergence of the so-called Islamic State (henceforth, ISIS). Since the summer of 2014 refugee waves and irregular migration more generally from the Middle East and Africa towards Europe reached unprecedented levels (FRONTEX 2016). The refugee crisis that broke out as a result of the ISIS advances was called historic and was compared to that of World War II.

These dramatic developments were accompanied by the intensification of ISIS-led or ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Europe and around the globe – a problem with clear political-ideological dimensions as well. As such, the issue of Islamic radicalization became salient as well since, despite fear-mongering rhetoric from far-right parties in Europe, most terrorist attacks were not conducted by refugees coming from the Middle East but rather by radicalized European citizens some of whom, however, seem to have returned to Europe after having travelled to Syria or elsewhere as “foreign fighters” (Funk & Parkes 2016; SoufanGroup 2015). This volatile situation also created a vicious cycle whereby Islamic terrorism fuels Islamophobia, Islamophobia assists Islamic radicalization, and Islamic radicalization – among other reasons – leads to acts of terrorism.

Cyprus has thus far not experienced such terrorist attacks or massive waves of refugees. Of course there have been allegations that European jihadists use Cyprus as a route to get to Syria and join ISIS (SigmaLive 2015). In any case, Cyprus’ geographical proximity to the Middle East zones of conflict renders the island an area of high risk. Moreover, the security vacuum and the salience of Islam in the Turkey-controlled northern Cyprus create the conditions for radicalization of individuals or the operation of terrorist networks (Klokkaris 2016), even though nothing like this has manifested or been confirmed so far. At the same time, growing nationalism in the RoC, especially as expressed with the election of ELAM (National Popular Front) to parliament, assisted by a deepening local and

---

9 A sister party to the Greek “Golden Dawn”.

14
international economic and political crisis (see more in Katsourides 2013) is also a factor of concern as it has already led to some limited incidents of political violence against migrants and Turkish-Cypriots.\textsuperscript{10}

In terms of northern Cyprus, the demographic realities are not only complicated because of the unregulated and uncontrolled movement of persons, due to absence of international law application, but also because of Turkish migrants or settlers who are often not recorded (Hatay 2007). In addition, it should be noted that the population from mainland Turkey is more pious and conservative than the Turkish-Cypriots, who are generally more secular and less religious (Hatay 2015; Yeşilada 2009).

Therefore, the Turkish population along with refugees and irregular migrants that end up in northern Cyprus from the Middle East through Turkey (TRNC 2015) significantly affect the demographic synthesis of the Turkish-Cypriot community at the expense of Turkish-Cypriot identity (Hatay 2009) even as they create unchartered socio-economic and cultural conditions that, in the worst-case scenario, may favour extremist phenomena.

The above-mentioned dynamics should not be considered independently of Turkish policy towards northern Cyprus. Particularly since 2004 the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey stepped up its Islam-oriented policies in northern Cyprus on multiple levels. These included the promotion of investments from Islamic businesses, the establishment of new Islamic cultural organizations, Quran summer schools in Turkey for children from northern Cyprus, the opening of Islamic theology schools, and the introduction of compulsory Islamic religion lessons in schools, to name a few (Bozkurt 2014; Moudouros 2013).\textsuperscript{11} The result has been the increasing conservativeness and Islamization of northern Cyprus.

It is also worth noting that a number of other Muslim countries, such as Qatar, have developed various activities, including investments, in northern Cyprus (Plumer 2015). These activities expand to the religious domain as well since there are suspicions that Arab Islamic scholars (e.g. from Saudi Arabia or Qatar) exert ideological influence in certain groups or through certain mosques in northern Cyprus;\textsuperscript{12} it is also believed that some of them adhere to the extremist Wahhabi school of Islam (for Wahhabism see Tziarras 2017; Wiktorowicz 2006). And “even though Mosques might not be major places for radicalisation, attending Mosques associated with extremism can be seen as a contributing factor in the pre-radicalisation process” (Precht 2007). From this perspective, the socio-cultural landscape in northern Cyprus is rather complex and could produce challenges in the medium to long term.

**Policy-Making Challenges in a Post-Settlement Context**

Regardless of what the settlement will be, these socio-economic, cultural and political realities in TCC are not likely to be reversed – some transformation on these levels has already taken place. In this sense, the Federal Cyprus of the future will contain, apart from elements of Turkish-Cypriot identity, at least some elements of Islam which were “borrowed” from Turkey and the Middle East. This means that

\textsuperscript{10} It is worth noting that, as already mentioned, the far-right produces and re-produces Islamophobia, especially in the context of a massive refugee crisis. This has become an integral part of ELAM’s rhetoric and policies as well; it is partly fueled by and it capitalizes on the broader issue of migration and refugees.

\textsuperscript{11} Also, interview with a person from Turkey who wished to remain anonymous and has been involved in promoting “Islamic” investments in northern Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{12} Based on three interviews with experts conducted by Zenonas Tziarras, December 2016. The interviewees wished to remain anonymous.
Cyprus will be *de facto* more prone to Islamic radicalization and extremism, especially if Turkey’s Islamization policies are taken into account. It also means that, in absence of adequate control and monitoring, the religious domain might remain vulnerable to external influence by religious leaders from Turkey (and the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs) or elsewhere and by Turkey-influenced Islamic organizations located in northern Cyprus (Dayıoğlu & Hatay 2014).

Though these policy areas (e.g. religious affairs) will largely fall under the authority of the constituent states in the context of a federation, driven by concerns the Greek-Cypriot constituent state might ask for certain regulations to be implemented. If such warnings are dismissed and the worst case scenario of an Islamic terrorist attack becomes reality – be it against a Cypriot target or against a foreign one, e.g. a foreign embassy – tensions might easily arise. Similarly, the Greek constituent state might protest any potential violation of the agreed ratio for Turkish immigrants, or even the unregulated status of immigrants from other destinations. The same might happen with Greek immigrants but, historically, the former is more likely especially because of how Turkey used immigration and settler politics as a foreign policy strategy in Cyprus (for research on this subject see Besima et al. 2015; Hatay 2005; Loizides 2011). The result will again be political instability because bi-communal friction as well as demographic imbalances.

On the other hand, political violence against Turks or Turkish-Cypriots by Greek-Cypriot far-right groups in the Greek-Cypriot constituent state is also a possibility, especially if we take into account recent incidents (see e.g. Psyllides 2015). The pre-emption of these scenarios in a post-settlement Cyprus has to start from the here and now in both communities. Such phenomena could really hinder a transitional period to Federal Cyprus or the sustainability of the settlement itself. They could provide pretext to and trigger other extremist elements of each community or politicians who are eager to capitalize on them and engage in “blame games”. At the same time they can give rise to or exacerbate existing insecurities and threat perceptions that could feed into or be manipulated by politics thus, again, contributing to an inter-communal crisis and unfortunate developments.

5 The Way Forward

Given the complex regional security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean, Federal Cyprus’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are issues which certainly require deliberate consideration with more of an international focus. A security regime has to be established in a post-solution Cyprus to deal with various external security challenges which are usually transboundary in their nature. Hence, there are a number of points that need to be taken into account while underlining security in the context of a post-settlement Cyprus. First of all, sides will need to trust each other. This can be seen as a precondition for an effective power-sharing, and at the same time it is more of an issue that can be viewed within the framework of communal matters.

5.1 Power-Sharing and Decision-Making

Turkey’s influence over Federal Cyprus’s political and security affairs for instance was cited as the biggest security fear of Greek Cypriot Community (GCC) in 2004 when the majority of the Greek Cypriots voted against the Anan Plan. Secondly, beyond communal trust issues, the external security of Federal Cyprus needs to be examined from a more international perspective in a context where Turkey, Greece,
and Britain have been having a say on the security matters of the island since 1960. It is also argued that an external body will be needed, one which can monitor the reached agreement in Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay 2008; Duba 2016). It is clear that the establishment of a security regime in Federal Cyprus to tackle external security problems will not be an easy task in the absence of mutual interests.

For mutual interests to arise, the development of a peace culture involving sentiments for cooperation and mutual understanding is viewed as necessary. Based on other cases such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, such elements require at least a decade to flourish (Duba 2016). In federal practices such as in the USA (LaCroix 2011), Canada, Belgium, and Germany there were mutual interests already in place at the creation of federal structures where federalism was not a necessary arrangement to make the system work. However, states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Sri Lanka are considered to be cases where federalism has been imposed by external parties as a reconciliation tool in post-conflict contexts. The fundamental problem in these cases is seen as the lack of mutual interest. For sure, the creation of mutual interests is desired and attempted via certain power-sharing arrangements and external intervention for the provision of guarantees in such a fragile context. Hence, in a post-settlement context, there will be particular arrangements of power-sharing which will definitely be unique to Cyprus. Although there are differing views with regard to possible styles of such arrangements in general, the ultimate goals is commonly understood as creating consensual decision-making mechanisms for enhancing cooperation and mutual understanding between communities in a given federal structure.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is seen that the representatives of the international community have played an important role in power-sharing arrangements, both in terms of monitoring the implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the guarantees in general. Through the Peace Implementation Council and the Office of the High Representative, the international community acted as the guarantor of the Dayton Peace Agreement and as its final interpreter. Moreover, the international community took part in the implementation of the Dayton process through NATO, the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and many other international governmental and non-governmental organisations (Keil 2013). A similar framework could be viewed as necessary for Cyprus until a security regime can be established and sustained. The problem in relation to that can be the creation of dependency on external assistance. This holds the risk of hindering the development of a political

13 Personal interview with E. Sülün, 1 December 2016.
14 See Arend Lijphart 2004 'Constitutional Design for Divided Societies' in: Journal of Democracy, 15, 2, 96–109; and Donald Horowitz 1993, 'Democracy in Divided Societies' in: Journal of Democracy, 4, 4, 18–38. While Lijphart recognizes different groups within a polity and argues that they have to be provided with autonomy in the areas of culture and education and they have to be included in central decision-making through grand coalitions, Horowitz argues for an "integrative approach" which focuses on electoral rules that favour pre-election multinational coalitions, in particular. Furthermore, Lijphart prefers homogenous regions within a federation, whilst Horowitz claims that multinational regions will enhance cooperation and mutual understanding. Timothy Sisk, on the other hand, argues that power-sharing mechanisms should not be limited with these two choices but the institutional design has to be tailored for the case at hand. Stefan Wolff also has a similar argument where he argues that a complex institutional structure is required in federal states, which needs to be seen beyond the autonomy/ (ethno-) federalism (traditional) models of power-sharing and power-dividing. For Sisk, see Timothy Sisk 1996 Power-Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, United States Institute of Peace: Washington D.C.; for Wolff, see Stefan Wolff 2009 'Complex Power-sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in Contemporary Conflict Settlements' in: Ethnopolitics, 8, 1, 27–45. For an analysis of the Bosnian Federation in terms of power-sharing mechanisms see S. Keil 2013 Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ashgate, England.
16 It is important to note that in the Bosnian example, international representatives were involved in crucial decisions and became actors in the power-sharing negotiations (e.g. the international judges in the Constitutional Court).
culture of consensus and reciprocity between the two communities and reveals the urgency for the development of a common security culture in Federal Cyprus.

5.2 The Need for a Federal Security Culture

Burgess (2012) defines Cyprus as one of the cases of transitional federal democracies, as a federation-in-the-making. In other words, a federal spirit in Cyprus is absent, contrary to cases such as Belgium and Russia. Based on that knowledge, a political culture of consensus and reciprocity is seen as an inevitable part of any settlement in Cyprus. **Only a federal security culture and the strategic formulation of a common sense of direction will work in the anticipated federal framework. A political culture as such will necessarily be implemented by federal institutions and potentially be monitored by external actors at the initial stages of a settlement.** This will be done with the expectation that this will in time be affected by successful political socialization towards the creation of a genuine federal political and security culture (Duba 2016).

Under these conditions, for Cyprus, the international community (the UN and the EU in particular) will be expected to exert external pressure, not in a coercive form, for sure, so that Federal Cyprus can sustain its federal structure (Burgess 2012; Duba 2016). The strengthening of federal democracy, civil society, liberal democratic constitutionalism, and political culture all have practical utility in such a transformation. In this vein, foreign and security policies of federal Cyprus eventually will be based more on shared interests only if the political socialization succeeds in bringing about a more self-sustaining federal structure in Cyprus. It is seen that the question of which security policy options will be pursued in a post-settlement context is an important one for the examination of security culture assumptions, policy preferences and foreign policy behaviour (security policy). Since fragmented security culture can be the outcome of differing geopolitical views, values and historical experience, further examination of these factors for each community in Cyprus is necessary for a more solid understanding of fragmented strategic culture in federations-in-the-making.

6 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

By taking into account the regional geopolitical dynamics, the current conflicting interests within Cyprus and the different policy preferences, it has been demonstrated how post-settlement Cyprus could face a number of security challenges and threats. Many of these challenges, despite their external dimension, are clearly associated with various political dynamics within Cyprus and more specifically with the prospective federal structure as well.

To look ahead and foresee what might happen and how the security or stability of Federal Cyprus might be challenging, not least because considering some of the worst-case scenarios, is neither a pleasant nor a hope-bearing task. But, as stated at the beginning, it is necessary in order for the appropriate pre-emption and prevention measures and policies to be adopted. Diagnosis should always come first no matter how harsh it might be; wishful thinking is not the way to go, especially when talking about a country with a past of violent conflict. An approach such as the one followed in this paper is helpful in the sense that it highlights certain vulnerable points of a post-settlement Cyprus that may, or may not, turn into significant political deadlocks or crises.
It seems that whatever the (external) security challenge might be, whether foreign policy, energy security, or political-violence related, it all comes down to the functionality of the federal state; of the decision-making mechanisms, the converging or diverging preferences and the way the two constituent states perceive and pursue their “national” interest. In that sense, the basic challenge we identify is the effort to achieve such a political system as well as the development of a federal security culture. Especially the latter will take time, but the two sides should exhaust every means available to achieve it. We should not disregard the fact that political will is going to have a central role in this and that an inspiring top-down effort will go a long way.

Targeted actions should be undertaken as soon as possible for the development of a federal security culture – i.e. the convergence of communal interests and preferences – which will allow for joint strategic formulation and a common sense of direction in the various policy areas of the federal state. For example:

- Inform the public on common security concerns; develop a security culture around common threats to and concerns of the two communities.
- Track-1 should become more transparent. This will help in developing trust and alleviating fears, phobias and insecurities.
- Offer a vision for security in Cyprus and the constructive role of a Federal Cyprus in the region – a mediator, an EU-values anchor, etc. Communicate that to the public without painting a rosy picture. Outline the real challenges and provide realistic solutions.

In order for a federal security culture to be forged, and security to be achieved, the creation of federal security forces is also imperative. Federal Cyprus will have to be able to defend itself against asymmetric threats, to secure its maritime and airspaces, as well as its natural resources. It will also need to have the tools in order to be a useful party in the various multilateral regional partnerships as well as in EU’s external operations. For this reason:

- As mentioned above, the establishment of air and naval forces is a prerequisite. In addition, land forces (army) should be established but remain limited in number, be flexible, professional, well-trained, well-equipped, and have the support of new (defence) technologies. Emphasis should be given on units of Special Forces, Cyber-Security, marines as well as anti-terror squats.
- Also important is the establishment of a separate Security & Rescue Unit and its direct incorporation into the EU security mechanism (Common Security & Defence Policy, CSDP) and other such regional or international mechanisms (e.g. OSCE).

Beyond the need for a federal security culture, a number of other issues that stem from this paper’s analysis, need to be addressed carefully in order for Federal Cyprus to be able to pre-empt, counter and alleviate potential threats and challenges that may arise.

First, the issue of maritime zones (territorial waters, continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone) between Federal Cyprus and Turkey has to be settled during the negotiations, before the agreement. This is particularly important given that Turkey is not a signatory to the International Law of the Sea Convention (1982) and politically interprets these spaces and boundaries in a fundamentally different way than the RoC. If necessary steps are not taken, maritime zones could become a significant point of friction and contestation within Cyprus and the region. Moreover, maritime areas are directly linked to the security of the country’s sovereign rights as well as its (maritime) natural resources. From this perspective, the federal state should have the capacity to secure and defend its resources and sovereign rights. To that end:

- A Joint Committee on Regional and Maritime Security can be established to monitor developments and prepare reports on interests that directly affect Cyprus. This Committee could start informing
track-one immediately as a way of feeding into crucial negotiation matters such as the delimitation of maritime boundaries and natural resource management.

- Relatedly, emphasis should be put on developing federal naval (e.g. coastguard) and air forces in the medium term, particularly for monitoring and securing the EEZ and airspace.
- A formula on the issue of natural resources between the two constituent states should also be found. It should not be left for the post-agreement period. Contested natural resources are always a source of friction and conflict. Their security will also depend on this.
- There will be challenges and opportunities that will come with managing natural resources in Federal Cyprus. In order for natural resources to have a positive impact on the life of the people, sustainable development has to be a main objective. To avoid the risk of corruption and adverse environmental and social impact, proper policies need to be developed. First and foremost, the socio-economic and developmental needs of the citizens should be taken into account while outlining the aspects of natural resource governance. For a sustainable management of natural resources with a focus on natural gas and other valuable resources such as water, both communities have to come to an understanding regarding the development of:
  - A shared understanding on the fundamentals of the industry and facts on the ground
  - A transparent legal framework
  - A fair share of revenues
  - An effective management framework for environmental risks
  - A management plan for the revenues towards economic development for both communities
  - A framework to involve the citizens in the overall process.

All of these aspects are quite complex and have linkages with regional and global dynamics. For the development of a common sense of direction, experts from both communities and abroad should be invited to work on drafting a sustainable natural resource development plan for Cyprus. This can be initiated as a separate process in the beginning and then findings and suggestions can be brought together at the later stages. Such an initiative can provide preliminary data and insights for the management of natural resources in a Federal Cyprus, as an issue area which will be under the competence of the federal state. It could be suggested that, particularly for the TCC an energy outlook and energy strategy paper could be drafted based on EU’s energy priorities. This could later facilitate the harmonization of the constituent states’ energy strategies and the development of a coherent energy policy framework for Cyprus.

Second, in light of the rise of Islamist extremist in the region and of the far-right in Europe in conjunction with problems of irregular migration, refugees and economic crisis, post-settlement Cyprus should take all necessary measures to prevent either terrorist attacks or political violence of any kind – nationalist, religious, etc. To that end:

- Extremist ideological phenomena should be monitored and controlled. Mechanisms should be put in place before, as well as after, the solution that will monitor the rise of the extreme right and Islamist extremism in both constituent states. Political violence incidents before or after settlement should be dealt with immediately with full application of the rule of law and accountability for those responsible. This will work towards building trust, reconciliation and alleviating threats and fears. Political will is of the essence.
- This goal could be served through the establishment of a Federal Centre for the Monitoring of Extremism, as an independent institution, that would collaborate closely with the police, intelligence services and the judiciary.
Moreover, strong anti-racist/anti-terrorist legislation should be drafted in both constituent states that would strictly punish any systematic hate speech, racist crimes, and the use or threat of force at the inter-communal level.

Strong legislation in both constituent states regarding gun possession (for purposes of sport/hunting/self-defense) should be drafted as well. There should be a registry of gun serial numbers and owners from the first day of the settlement. This would allow for close monitoring and easier identification of any kind of future crimes or political violence involving guns.

The future of other domestic groups in the context of Federal Cyprus should also be considered and settled. For example, Armenians, Latins, Maronites, Kurds, Chechens, Russians, and Islamic orders (Tariqats). Some of these groups could potentially be manipulated from abroad or by other domestic powers and be utilized as political leverages.

Lastly, and to go beyond domestic repercussions of security challenges, there are certain policies that a Federal Cyprus could pursue to deal with its unstable geopolitical environment as well as to acquire a constructive role in it. Such policies, as noted below, will not only contribute to its own (external and internal) security but also allow Cyprus to develop its own foreign policy identity and claim a noteworthy position within the regional and international system.

Following from what this paper has outlined, the different parties of a Federal Cyprus would first of all have to try hard to respect the integrity of their political system and strive for its sustainability, development and growth.

A post-settlement context would allow Cyprus to adopt a much more pro-active foreign policy in the region, not least as the EU member-state with the closest proximity to the problems of the Middle East. Apart from the issue of the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy architecture, where Cyprus could have a central role, a number of other foreign policy instruments could be developed and utilized with the aim of promoting peace, stability and cooperation. These could regard Cyprus’ involvement in bilateral or multilateral agreements on various levels; in the development of an elaborate international network that would promote regional security and economic integration; in mediation efforts regarding regional problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, etc.

In the context of a more pro-active foreign policy, Cyprus could also try to further engage the EU and acquire a productive role in its Common Foreign & Security Policy or Common Security & Defense Policy in the area. It could also seek to become an anchor or promoter of EU’s policies in the region by supporting peace-building or democracy-promotion initiatives.

A Federal Cyprus with enhanced regional ties could well advocate for a tailor-made EU Eastern Mediterranean policy that could of course be linked to the European Neighborhood Policy.

Finally, Federal Cyprus could try to assist democratization processes in the Arab World and beyond; as an EU member-state as well as individually. It could offer know-how on various aspects of democratic development especially in post-Arab Spring states, regarding, for example, the issue of human rights, the rule of law, democratic reforms, economic development, etc.
7 References


Bozkurt, U. 2014. Turkey: From the 'Motherland' to the 'IMF of Northern Cyprus'. *The Cyprus Review*, 26, 1, 83-105.


Good, A. 2014. East Mediterranean Natural Gas and Israel’s Regional Foreign Policy. The Institute For Middle East Studies.


OmadaKypros 2015. Αποτελέσματα Έρευνας Κοινής Γνώμης Για Το Κυπριακό [Results of Public Opinion Poll on the Cyprus Problem]. omadakypros.eu/%CE%B5%CE%BE%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%AF% CE%BE%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/item/350-apotelesmata-ereunas-omadakypros.html.


8 About this Publication

About the authors

Emine Eminel Sülün received her Ph.D. in International Relations in January 2016. Between September 2012 and June 2016, Eminel Sülün taught at Eastern Mediterranean University as a part-time member of staff in the Political Science and International Relations department. In 2014, she received an International Studies Association (ISA) Travel Grant for the ISA Annual Conference, 2014, Toronto, Canada. In 2015, Eminel Sülün again received an International Studies Association (ISA) Travel Grant for the ISA Annual Conference, 2015, New Orleans, USA. She presented in both conferences. In September 2016, Eminel Sülün started teaching at Near East University as a full-time faculty member in the International Relations department. She is currently researching on security and eastern Mediterranean politics.

Zenonas Tziarras holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, UK where he taught World Politics. His doctoral thesis, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under the AKP: a Neoclassical Realist Account,” is the first comprehensive neoclassical realist analysis of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. He has been an analyst and researcher for a number of think tanks and research projects in Cyprus and abroad, and taught Greek-Turkish Relations as well as Strategy & War in the Department of Social & Political Sciences at the University of Cyprus. He is Lecturer in Security & Regional Studies for the MA in Security & Diplomacy Studies in the School of Law of UCLan Cyprus. His publications include books, book chapters and journal articles on Turkish politics, Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean affairs.
About the editors

Ahmet Sözen has been working in the field of peacebuilding and democratization processes over the last twenty years. He has participated in first-track peace-negotiations in Cyprus, has been actively involved in second-track peace and democratization initiatives, has been providing training and education in the areas of conflict resolution, mediation and peacebuilding and has designed policy recommendations based on objective participatory research with the societal stakeholders and polling. Apart from his Research Director position at SeeD, he is a Professor of International Relations and the Vice Rector for Academic Affairs at Eastern Mediterranean University, Director of the Cyprus Policy Center and member of the Greek-Turkish Forum. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Missouri-Columbia (USA).

Jared L. Ordway is currently a member of the International Peacebuilding Advisory Team at Interpeace. Between 2016-2017, he served as Senior Dialogue Facilitator for Berghof Foundation where, among other duties, he provided technical and advisory support to the joint Security Dialogue Project in Cyprus. His previous work encompasses practitioner and educator roles in conflict transformation initiatives by governmental and non-governmental organizations. Dr Ordway is an active expert on the UNDP roster for Rapid Response in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, and with the Vilson Groh Institute, where he advises on issues of conflict and urban violence affecting periphery communities in south Brazil. He is an adjunct faculty member at American University's School of International Service in Washington, DC and with Champlain College’s Mediation and Conflict Studies Graduate Program in Vermont (USA), and has held previous adjunct appointments at Columbia University of New York and Costa Rica’s Universidad Nacional. He holds a PhD in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford (UK).

About the publication

This publication was produced in the framework of the Security Dialogue Project, a jointly implemented project by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD), Interpeace and Berghof Foundation. The project aims at supporting the Cyprus Peace Process by contributing to the identification of informed, creative and viable security options that could enable all communities in Cyprus to simultaneously feel secure and, ultimately, at supporting the recent developments of top political leadership initiatives on both sides to move beyond entrenched positions. Drawing upon examples from similar and/or applicable scenarios and lessons learned, and by developing an understanding of possible approaches to the respective issues in transitional Cyprus, this paper aims at supporting the project’s goal. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Berghof Foundation and SeeD or their project partners. For further information please contact the programme director Luxshi Vimalarajah, at l.vimalarajah@berghof-foundation.org.

More information:
