It seems that when human security stems from dissatisfaction with civic life and distrust in institutions, it has a different effect on political integration than when it emerges from satisfaction with personal life. Dissatisfaction with civic governance and distrust in institutions breed insecurity, which translates into a desire to change the system. When insecurity is more closely related to dissatisfaction with personal life, rather than with the state, this leads to less openness to change and the inclusion of the other, or to reconciliation with members of the outgroup. Both of these trends coexist, although possibly not within the same individual, within the Bosniak population.
Chapter Five
The Bosnia-Herzegovina SCORE: Measuring peace in a multi-ethnic society

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Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) was the first country after Cyprus where SCORE was implemented. The main groups studied were Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. As in Cyprus, the two main dimensions which made up the index in Bosnia-Herzegovina were; social cohesion and reconciliation. The political outcome was political integration defined as readiness for political compromise and the ability to envisage a shared future with other ethnic groups.

The presentation of the SCORE results for Bosnia-Herzegovina will follow the same format as for Cyprus, with the results of the descriptive analysis presented first. In this section, we will be presenting the results for all the main dimensions and their indicators, as well as those for other indicators of interest. Where there are significant discrepancies in the demographic break-down they will also be mentioned.

This section will be followed by the results of the predictive analysis. This will highlight the indicators of social cohesion and of reconciliation which significantly predict political integration. The chapter will conclude by outlining and discussing the main findings and making corresponding policy recommendations.

Methodological highlights

The index was calibrated for use in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2013 and data was collected in March and April 2014. Participants were citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina aged 18 and above. Random stratified sampling was used to produce a representative sample of the population. A total of 2,000 respondents were interviewed face-to-face. Of these, 858 were Bosniaks (43%), 847 were Serbs (42%) and 214 Croats (11%). The remaining
respondents were from other ethnic groups and were excluded from the analysis. This reduced the sample size to 1,919.

The sample comprised 43% male participants and 57% female. The ratio of men to women was about the same across the three ethnic groups. Furthermore, 49% of the sample was recruited from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH), 49% from Republika Srpska (RS) and 2% from the neutral, self-governing, Brcko District. Sampling took into account the ethnic composition of each entity; the table below provides a breakdown of each entity’s sample by ethnic group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity’s N</th>
<th>Total Entity’s N</th>
<th>Bosniaks (N (% of entity’s N))</th>
<th>Serbs (N (% of entity’s N))</th>
<th>Croats (N (% of entity’s N))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina (FBiH)</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>698 (75%)</td>
<td>66 (8%)</td>
<td>170 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika Srpska (RS)</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>131 (14%)</td>
<td>775 (82%)</td>
<td>39 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brcko Districs (BD)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29 (73%)</td>
<td>6 (14%)</td>
<td>5 (13%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Breakdown of each entity’s sample by ethnic group.

The majority of participants from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina were Bosniaks, followed by Croats. Serbs formed only a small fraction of the sample. Not surprisingly, Serbs constituted the vast majority of the sample from Republika Srpska. There is also a sizeable Bosniak minority living in RS, which was proportionately represented in the sample.

The substantial Bosniak minority resident in RS has made it necessary, where appropriate, for us to disaggregate results from Bosniak respondents by entity (FBiH vs RS). The same was done for Serbs, with the caveat that the results for Serbs living in the FBiH should be interpreted cautiously, since the sample size of 66 was small. This also applies to results from Brcko District. A sample size of 40 is extremely small and makes it impossible for the results from Brcko to be interpreted in isolation.
Measuring social cohesion, reconciliation, and political integration

As with SCORE Cyprus, our initial task was to identify the indicators of social cohesion and of reconciliation based on the actual data. The process entailed finding a solution that best fitted the data and which did not differ significantly between ethnic groups. Since it is likely that different groups understand abstract concepts, such as social cohesion, differently, in order to carry out a valid comparison between ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had to verify first that the three groups conceptualised the concepts in the same way. We needed to ensure in other words, that the sub-indicators and indicators defining each dimension did not differ from group to group.

Our analyses yielded that the dimension of social cohesion was best defined by three distinct indicators, human security, trust in institutions, and satisfaction with civic life. These indicators differed from those identified as defining social cohesion in Cyprus 2014. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, unlike Cyprus, the representational capacity of institutions and freedom from corruption did not emerge as indicators of social cohesion. This is because the representational capacity of institutions could not, empirically, (based on our data) be distinguished from trust in institutions. The items measuring trust in institutions and those measuring representation by them were very highly correlated and loaded onto the same factor. We therefore decided to retain the three items measuring trust in institutions in our model, while keeping in mind that trust in institutions and confidence in their representational capacity were essentially the same thing.

Human security was measured as one construct in SCORE Bosnia-Herzegovina. In SCORE Cyprus 2014, it was broken down to its constituents, which resulted in measuring three types of security; political, personal, and economic. SCORE Bosnia-Herzegovina was implemented before the break-down of human security was conceptualised, hence its uni-dimensional structure in the index.

The figure below shows the three indicators making up the social cohesion dimension and the items through which each of the indicators was measured.

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1 The measure of corruption in a new addition to the SCORE Cyprus 2014 which was conducted after SCORE BiH was implemented. We suggest to add this dimension in future reiteration of SCORE BiH.
The reconciliation dimension was made up of five indicators: negative stereotypes, intergroup anxiety, social distance, social threats, and positive feelings. These indicators are almost identical to those used in SCORE Cyprus. The only difference being that the indicator ‘active discrimination’ was replaced in this instance by ‘positive feelings’. The items measuring each of these indicators are provided in the figure below. The only indicator that was not measured by multiple items, was positive feelings. To measure positive feelings respondents were asked to rate their feelings towards different outgroups on a scale that ranged from very negative to very positive.

Finally, we looked at the items included in the questionnaire measuring Bosnians’ vision for their country. We extracted those items that measured citizens’ views on political integration, which all loaded onto one factor. This factor, which we labelled ‘political integration’, formed the third dimension of the index. The items are presented in the figure below.
Figure 2. Indicators of reconciliation and items used to measure each indicator.

Figure 3. Items measuring political integration.
Results

What do the numbers mean?

The numbers presented in the descriptive section of the results range from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates very low levels of an indicator / dimension and 10 the maximum possible. The numbers in the predictive section represent regression coefficients which indicate whether and how, indicators relate to each other. Regression coefficients are only presented if they are significant at the 95% level (which means that their p-value is below .05). Greater coefficient values indicate stronger relationships between indicators. A positive value indicates a positive relationship between the two variables, while a negative value indicates a negative one.

Part A: Descriptive analysis

Social Cohesion and related indicators

In this section we will present the results for social cohesion and the indicators which make it up. Results will be disaggregated by entity (FBiH and RS) as well as by ethnic group. Apart from social cohesion, a number of other variables were measured that were theoretically related to it, but which did not, in the end register as predictors of the construct. These variables were; satisfaction with personal life, identity preference and strength of identification with preferred identity, civic engagement and information consumption.

Social cohesion

Entity level

There are discrepancies between entities, with the inhabitants of the Republika Srpska experiencing higher levels of social cohesion than citizens of either the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Brčko District (see Table 4).
We wanted to examine if this discrepancy reflected ethnic group differences, or whether it was attributable to differences in perception of social cohesion between the different entities. For this reason we focused on the two main entities (FBiH and RS), and produced social cohesion scores for both Bosniaks and for Serbs living in FBiH and in RS. (see Table 5).

Interestingly, comparisons between the results for Bosniaks and Serbs in both entities highlighted significant differences in social cohesion scores, depending on which entity respondents lived in. As we can see in Table 5, there are essentially no differences in social cohesion scores between Serbs and Bosniaks living in the FBiH. However, both Bosniaks and Serbs living in Republica Srpska, reported higher social cohesion scores than those in FBiH, where Bosniaks reported (even) higher scores than Serbs.

These results suggest that the issue of social cohesion is more of a problem in the Federation than in RS and that reported differences cannot be attributed to variations in perceptions of social cohesion by different ethnic groups. It is also interesting that Bosniaks living in RS report even higher levels of social cohesion than Serbs.

This leads to the next question, which is; what the drivers of social cohesion levels in each of the two main entities are, particularly in the Federation, where social cohesion levels are lower than in RS.
As seen in Table 6, the two entities differ for all indicators of social cohesion, with the difference being greatest for human security and satisfaction with civic life. FBiH scored lower on all indicators.

Trust in institutions is the indicator which the lowest scores in both entities. Social institutions are trusted more than the governing institutions in both places and of these, political parties are the least trusted in both FBiH and RS. The most trusted social institutions in FBiH are religious ones, with business and commercial institutions being least trusted. In RS the picture is different. There, the most trusted social institutions are those relating to health, while the least trusted are NGOs, possibly because of their perceived links with the international community.

Levels of human security were significantly lower in FBiH than in RS. Respondents in the FBiH scored particularly low in questions about whether they felt they were safe from crime. This was closely followed by fears that they may have difficulty accessing adequate health care provision. As far as satisfaction with civic life was concerned, the sources of greatest dissatisfaction were the same in both entities, namely, concerns about the performance of the economy and about the rule of law.

**Ethnic group level**

The breakdown of social cohesion scores by ethnic group mirrored the entity-level findings. As seen in Table 7, Serbs reported the highest levels of social cohesion and Bosniaks the lowest, with Croats somewhere in the middle. Bosniaks reported the lowest levels of human security across all groups, whereas both Bosniaks and Croats reported greater unhappiness with civic life by comparison with Serbs. Levels of trust in institutions (particularly political institutions and more specifically, politicians) were low among all groups - 3 on a scale from 0 to 10 - with the Bosniaks scoring the lowest.

Amongst Bosniaks, social cohesion scores were affected by certain demographic factors: age and levels of education and income. Older respondents, those with higher levels of education, or lower incomes, reported lower levels of social cohesion.
Table 5. Comparison of social cohesion scores of Bosniaks and Serbs living in FBiH and RS.

Table 6. Scores on each social cohesion indicator for FBiH and RS.
Table 7. Scores for social cohesion and its indicators amongst each of the three main ethnic groups.

Table 8. Scores for satisfaction with personal and civic life amongst Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.
Other SCORE indicators that are theoretically related to social cohesion

Satisfaction with personal life
In contrast to satisfaction with civic life, levels of satisfaction with personal life were significantly higher and did not differ between groups (see Table 8). However, although satisfaction with personal life was higher than with civic life, scores were in the mid-range suggesting that Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats were neither satisfied nor dis-satisfied with their personal lives.

Preferred identity and identification strength
Respondents were asked to choose from a list of identities that which best described them and to report how much their chosen identity meant to them (identification strength). The majority of all ethnic groups selected their own ethnic identity. Significantly more Serbs and Bosniaks 77% and 71% respectively, identified with their ethnic identities than Croats (55%). The percentages of all ethnic groups who chose to identify themselves as citizens of FBiH was small. However, a significantly greater percentage of Bosniaks and Croats (16%) and (11%), respectively, chose to do so, compared to just 4% of Serbs. Religious identity was selected by the same percent of respondents in all three communities.

Civic engagement and information consumption
Overall, levels of civic engagement were very low, much lower than levels of information consumption across all groups (see Table 10). One might even assume that the two are somehow inversely related. For example, Serbs adopt a “spectator” approach to public affairs, whereby they consume significantly more information than the other two groups, but also report least civic engagement.
Graph 1.
Self-identification amongst Bosniaks.

Graph 2.
Self-identification amongst Serbs.

Graph 3.
Self-identification amongst Croats.
Table 10. Information consumption and civic engagement.
Reconciliation and related indicators

Attitudes towards reconciliation were measured across all ethnic groups. Similarly to SCORE Cyprus, we measured reconciliatory attitudes between the main ethnic groups and also assessed the quality of intergroup relations between the main ethnic groups and ethnic minorities or other groups.

In addition to reconciliation, a number of other variables that are related theoretically to reconciliation were also measured. They are referred to here as reconciliation-related indicators. These were; cultural distance, trust in other groups and quantity and quality of contact between groups. Their results will also be presented.

Reconciliation

In terms of attitudes towards reconciliation; Croats were the most reconciliatory of the three, whereas Serbs and Bosniaks did not differ in terms of how reconciliatory they were towards each other or towards Croats (see Figure 4). Bosniaks living in RS were more reconciliatory towards Serbs than Bosniaks living in FBiH; this difference however, is not statistically significant.

Despite the relatively high reconciliation scores amongst the three main ethnic groups, (a score of over 6 on a 0 to 10 scale), all recorded lower results when asked about the quality of their relations with minorities. Serbs, on average, held the least positive attitude towards minorities and, especially towards Roma, Albanians, and Bosniaks from Sandžak.

Analyses looking into each indicator of reconciliation separately for the three groups showed no great disparities in their reconciliation 'profiles'. If there is one thing that stood out it is that Bosniaks perceived the other two groups as being somewhat more threatening.
Figure 4. Attitudes of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats towards mutual reconciliation and towards other ethnic groups. The closer the score is to 10, the higher the propensity for ‘reconciliation’ with that particular group.

In all groups, levels of education were positively associated with reconciliation, with more educated individuals being more readily reconciled to other groups. For Serbs, age was also a significant demographic indicator of reconciliation. Older Serbs were less reconciliatory towards Bosniaks in particular, and also, to a lesser extent, towards Croats.
Other SCORE indicators that are theoretically related to reconciliation

Cultural distance
Levels of reported cultural distance were low amongst all three main ethnic groups (see Figure 5). Croats reported the lowest levels of cultural distance, and also recorded the highest propensities for reconciliation, results which suggest that they are the most conciliatory of all the three main ethnic groups.

As far as the other two groups are concerned, Serbs reported lower cultural distance from Croats than Bosniaks, who did not differentiate between the other two ethnic groups. There was no demographic variable that predicted levels of cultural distance within any of the three main ethnic groups.

Figure 5. Levels of cultural distance between the three main ethnic groups and between each of the main groups and other ethnic groups.
Respondents reported relatively high levels of cultural distance from the remaining ethnic groups. Albanians, Jews and Roma were identified as being the most culturally distant by Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. Serbs and Croats reported almost no distance at all from Serbs and Croats (respectively) living outside BiH, highlighting the strength of the connections that these two respective groups have with Serbia and Croatia respectively. Bosniaks, too, reported less cultural distance from Bosniaks living in Sandzak, even though their levels of cultural similarity did not come close to those reported by Serbs and Croats for Serbs and Croats outside BiH.

**Trust in other groups**

The pattern of results for trust in other groups is similar to that for attitudes towards reconciliation. The significant finding here was that even though levels for reconciliation were above the midpoint (where the midpoint represents indifference towards reconciliation) levels of trust were below the midpoint (where the midpoint indicates neither trusting, nor mistrusting other groups). These results suggest that even though overall relations between the two groups are not negative, there is still little trust between them.

![Image](image_url)  
*Figure 6. Levels of trust recorded towards each of the main ethnic groups and towards other ethnic groups.*
The only reported exception to this was the attitudes of Croats towards the other two groups (see Figure 6). Croats reported significantly higher levels of trust towards both Bosniaks and Serbs. In fact, they were as trusting of Bosniaks and Serbs as they were towards Croats outside BiH.

Levels of trust towards the remaining ethnic groups (especially ethnic minorities) were low. Serbs, who were the most distrustful group on average, reported Croats outside BiH as being the group they trusted least, followed by Albanians, Roma, and Bosniaks from Sandzak. Interestingly, levels of trust experienced by Serbs living in Bosnia, for Serbs living outside the country, were only fractionally higher than midpoint, indicating that even though Bosnian Serbs feel culturally close to Serbs outside Bosnia-Herzegovina and have positive relations with them, they still do not trust them that much. Roma and Jews were the two groups Bosniaks trusted the least. Croats, for their part, considered Albanians to be the least trustworthy ethnic minority group.

**Quantity and quality of intergroup contact**

Levels of contact varied between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Croats reported high levels of contact with Bosniaks and lower levels of contact with Serbs (see Figure 7). This was expected, due to the fact that relatively few Croats live in RS where the majority of Serbs live. Bosniaks and Croats reported equal levels of contact, whereas Serbs report rather low levels of contact with Croats. In general, there was a discrepancy between the quantity of intergroup contact reported by Croats and the quantity of contact those same groups reported as having with Croats. However, this is also to be expected, since Croats constitute a minority in BiH and so objectively have more chances to meet members of the majority group, rendering higher levels of contact inevitable.

What is striking, is the very low levels of contact the three main ethnic groups reported having with other ethnic groups. As expected, there was more frequent contact with Roma, since they form a sizeable minority in BiH. Apart from this, levels of contact were rather low. This was the case even between Bosniaks and Bosniaks from Sandzak, Bosnian Serbs and Serbs outside BiH and between Bosnian Croats and Croats outside BiH.

Possibly the most positive finding in this area has been the quality of contact reported by all groups. Contact with each of the other two ethnic groups was described as being very positive (see Figure 8) by Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. This suggests that even though levels of contact are not extremely high, in those instances where it occurs, it is experienced as something positive. Interestingly, contact with Roma, an ethnic group
Figure 7. Quantity of contact with members of other ethnic groups.

Figure 8. Quality of contact with each of the other two ethnic groups and with Roma.
that the three main groups do not trust and are generally not very positively disposed towards, was also described as positive by all groups.

### Political integration

Three indicators, single presidency, change of political system and adoption of a new constitution, form the factor of political integration. Political integration is strongly supported by Bosniaks and is least supported by Serbs. The gap between them is, as predicted, very large. Croats generally support political integration and while they are not as supportive as Bosniaks, they are considerably more so than Serbs. (see Table 11).

Focusing on the item level of the political integration dimension, all groups supported a change in the current political system, preferring one that is more cooperative, more cohesive, and more reconciliatory, both towards the constituent ethnic groups and other minority groups living in BiH. The other two items, single presidency and adoption of a new constitution, elicited different levels of support among the three groups.

Croats endorsed the change of the current political system to a more reconciliatory one, more than they endorsed single presidency or the adoption of a new constitution to make Bosnia-Herzegovina more unified. In comparison to the other two groups, Serbs were particularly resistant to both the single presidency and to the adoption of a new, unifying constitution. Bosniaks, on the other hand, did not distinguish between any aspects of political integration and were equally supportive of all proposed constitutional and executive reforms.

A closer examination of the breakdown of ethnic group by entity (see Table 12) shows that Bosniaks living in RS support political integration significantly less than Bosniaks living in the federation, but that they are still much more supportive of political integration than Serbs living in the same entity. Interestingly, Serbs and Bosniaks living in FBiH are equally supportive of political integration. Caution is needed in interpreting these results as the sample size of Serbs living in the FBiH was very small.
Table 11. Scores for political integration and for the items measuring it amongst the three ethnic groups.

Table 12. Breakdown of scores for political integration amongst ethnic groups (Bosniaks vs. Serbs) by entity (FBiH vs RS).
Part B: Predictive analysis

As with SCORE Cyprus, this part of the results is devoted to answering the question: which aspects of social cohesion and of reconciliation predict the outcome variable. The working hypothesis is that indicators of social cohesion and indicators of reconciliation with adversary groups can be drivers of readiness for political compromise or, as in the case of BiH, drivers of willingness for political integration. For this purpose those indicators relating to social cohesion and those relating to reconciliation with the remaining two ethnic groups (along with key demographic variables) were pitted against each other, as possible predictors of political integration (see Figure 9). This analysis was performed for each of the three groups.

![Figure 9](image)

**Figure 9.** All social cohesion-related indicators (top row), all reconciliation-related indicators for each of the two remaining groups, Ethnic Group 1 (left column), Ethnic Group 2 (right column), and the key demographic variables (bottom row), were tested as predictors of political integration for each group.
Once we had identified the predictors of political integration for each of the three ethnic groups, we proceeded to investigate which other SCORE indicators were related to each predictor, so as to have a more complete picture of that indicator’s influence on political integration. We thus isolated each predictor and checked the variables that significantly correlated with it (see Figure 10). The results are reported and explained for each ethnic group separately.

Bosniaks

The key predictors of political integration for Bosniaks were; satisfaction with personal life, trust in institutions and contact with Croats (see Figure 11). Greater satisfaction with personal life predicted greater support for political integration. The closest factor to satisfaction with personal life was human security. The two were positively correlated; higher levels of satisfaction with personal life lead to higher human security and vice versa. Taken together, these results suggest that individuals who are more satisfied with their life and feel more secure, are more supportive of political integration. Conversely, individuals who are unsatisfied with their personal lives feel more insecure and endorse political integration less.
The second factor predicting Bosniak support for greater political integration was trust in institutions. Greater trust in institutions related to less support for political integration, or, to put in another way, reduced trust in institutions was related to greater support for political integration.

Trust in institutions was significantly correlated with satisfaction with civic life and human security. The less people trust institutions, the less they are satisfied with civic life and the less secure they feel. These in combination, lead to greater support for political integration.

This is an interesting finding that contradicts to some extent the findings above regarding human security. It seems that when human security stems from dissatisfaction with civic life and distrust in institutions, it has a different effect on political integration than when it emerges from satisfaction with personal life. Dissatisfaction with civic governance and distrust in institutions breed insecurity, which translates into a desire to change the system. When insecurity is more closely related to dissatisfaction with personal life, rather than with the state, this leads to less openness to change and the inclusion of the other, or to reconciliation with members of the outgroup. Both of these trends coexist, although possibly not within the same individual, within the Bosniak population.

Finally, contact with Croats is a positive predictor of political integration; the more contact Bosniak respondents reported having with Croats, the more they supported changes to the system that aimed at greater political integration. Importantly, contact with Croats related negatively to cultural distance, indicating that the more Croats are perceived as being culturally dissimilar by Bosniaks, the less contact they have with them and the less likely they are to endorse political integration.

It is noteworthy that none of the indicators of reconciliation towards Serbs (e.g., negative stereotypes towards Serbs, social threats from Serbs), have emerged as a significant indicator of political integration. This may be due to the fact that when Bosniaks consider greater political integration within Bosnia, they think first of Croats. This would suggest that for Bosniaks, relations between their group and Croats is a stronger predictor of attitudes towards political change than their relations with Serbs.
Serbs

Many more factors emerged as key indicators of political integration amongst Serbs. In terms of indicators of social cohesion, the amount of information consumed via the media, life satisfaction, and human security, all negatively predicted political integration. The more information an individual consumes, the more satisfied a person is with their own life, and the more safe a person feels, the less they are likely to aspire to political integration or political change.

As far as reconciliation is concerned, for Serbs, relations with Bosniaks (but not Croats) were found to impact on their support for political integration. Greater social distance and greater perceived threat from Bosniaks led to less support for political integration. Greater trust towards Bosniaks and greater contact with them, on the other hand, led to increased willingness for political integration.

Information consumption goes hand-in-hand with civic engagement and ingroup identification; the more engaged people are in civic matters and the more strongly they identify with their primary identity, the more information they consume. Men also
consume more information than women. If we were to cluster these categories together into a single profile, then we would have civically engaged men, who feel more strongly about being Serbian, who consume more media information and who, maybe because of that, do not support political integration in BiH.

Greater satisfaction with personal life was found to be associated with greater ingroup identification and greater satisfaction with civic life. Being more satisfied with personal, as well as with civic life, related to less support for political integration. Serb respondents reported being essentially happy with their lives as they were, a condition which made them less likely to want to risk the status quo and possibly jeopardise their general well-being. It is interesting that ingroup identification was associated with this predictor (satisfaction with personal life) too. In a sense the results here could suggest that high ingroup identification (verging on nationalism), is a factor contributing to the reluctance to integrate politically with other ethnic groups in Bosnia.

Human security among the Serb population is directly (and positively) related to satisfaction with civic life and trust in institutions. When human security is attributed to a well-run, functioning governance structure, then it leads to a general reluctance to change existing conditions. Conversely, those citizens who are unhappy with civic life and distrust institutions, feel less secure and are more ready to pursue change. Moreover, low human security is associated with greater civic engagement. When civic engagement clusters with low levels of human security, it leads to increased support for political integration. The opposite is true in cases where civic engagement clusters with information consumption, when it leads to a decrease in support for political integration.

As far as reconciliation predictors are concerned, the results of the predictive analysis suggest that nearly all aspects of reconciliation need to fall into place before political integration can be considered a desirable outcome by Serbs. Despite the fact that Serbs and Bosniaks have moved closer to a more reconciliatory perspective, more progress is needed before Serbs might be willing to consider political integration.

Serbs who distrusted Bosniaks and appeared to hold more negative stereotypes about them, also reported higher satisfaction with civic life (most likely in RS.) Trust was also however, related to contact; greater contact with Bosniaks led to greater trust and therefore to more willingness to integrate politically. Cultural distance too, was found to be linked to trust, with people who saw themselves as being more culturally different from Bosniaks also being less trusting towards them.
Greater social distance and increased perceptions of Bosniaks as threatening were both related to anxiety about contact. Greater anxiety about contact, led to a greater desire to have weak or non-existent ties with Bosniaks and a perception of them as posing a threat to the ingroup. Social distance was also related to cultural distance, with people who felt culturally different from Bosniaks also wanting to have less to do with them. Finally, age emerged as a factor affecting both social, as well as cultural distance. Older Serbs reported feeling more distant (both socially and culturally) from Bosniaks and (partly) for this reason they desired no political integration.

The last predictor of political integration to be discussed is contact with Bosniaks. In this case, contact related to cultural distance, trust, and age. More cultural distance was associated with less contact and vice-versa whereas greater trust was related to more...
contact. Older Serbs reported the least contact with Bosniaks. It is important to emphasise that contact between the two groups turned out to be a significant positive factor for political integration both for Bosniaks and for Serbs. This is of the utmost importance as it seems to suggest that greater (positive) contact between the two groups would promote greater willingness for coexistence under a more inclusive political system.

**Croats**

Three indicators were identified as contributing significantly to political integration for Croats. These were: satisfaction with civic life, contact with Serbs and cultural distance from Bosniaks. Satisfaction with civic life was related to more trust in institutions and together these factors led to less support for political integration. Seen from a different angle, distrust in institutions and dissatisfaction with civic life yield greater support for political integration. This is a finding that all three groups had in common.

Paradoxically, contact with Serbs, was found to be negatively related to willingness for political integration; the more contact Croat respondents reported having with Serbs, the less willing they were to endorse greater political inclusiveness. This rather counter-

![Figure 13. Predictors of political integration for Croats and variables associated with them.](image)
intuitive finding becomes even harder to interpret given the fact that Bosnian Croats reported contact with Serbs as being very positive. So, a positive occurrence that has negative effects on political inclusiveness seems rather odd. A possible explanation could be that perhaps the majority of Croats who have contact with Serbs, are themselves unsupportive of political integration. If this is indeed the case, then this group may be aligning themselves with Serbs who in general are resistant to the idea of political integration. Yet a different explanation for this finding could be that a percentage of Croats might be reporting very negative contact with Serbs, leading to greater resistance to a political system that includes them. This explanation however, seems less likely, given that overall, Croats reported very positive contact between the two groups.

Interestingly and predictably, by comparison, good relations between Croats and Bosniaks related positively to political integration. The less culturally distant Croats perceived themselves to be from Bosniaks, the more they trusted them and the more contact they had. This made them more supportive of political integration.

Key findings and policy recommendations

• **Finding 1**
  Of all the social cohesion indicators, trust in institutions was particularly low across all ethnic groups (and entities). Less trust in institutions was linked to greater support for changes to the political system to make BiH more integrated, cohesive and reconciliatory.

**Discussion**

All ethnic groups reported roughly equally low levels of trust towards institutions with the least trust expressed towards politicians. In a state where service delivery is weak and institutions are distrusted, the social contract is under strain. The results show that in BiH the only ethnic group that seemed committed to active engagement in political action for change were Bosniaks, probably because they feel closer to the state. Mistrust of institutions is not eliciting an impulse towards civic engagement for either Serbs or Croats.

While taking action to change things demonstrates Bosniak commitment to changing a malfunctioning system, social unrest as a result of disappointment with state delivery is also likely to have negative effects on intergroup relations. Hence the only way forward seems to be to work on the ability of the governing institutions to deliver public services and to bolster their integrity.
Policy recommendation
Building trust in government institutions needs to be part of a participatory process, taking particular care to engage with disenfranchised groups who may feel under-represented and powerless, such as Serbs.

Finding 2
Bosniaks experience very low levels of human security, lower than either Serbs or Croats. Human security was found to predict social cohesion in opposing ways, depending on which other factors it linked with.

Discussion
Bosniaks’ low human security stems mainly from the belief that they are unprotected from crime. This seems to have had an impact on respondents’ satisfaction with their personal lives and has consequences for political integration. The more insecure people feel in their daily lives, the more they ‘hunker down’ and are resistant to change. This is a common finding reported in the development literature: when human security is at stake, intergroup relations and peaceful coexistence suffer.

When, however, human security is linked with satisfaction with civic life, then the nature of the relationship between security and political integration changes. The less secure people feel, and the more they link this insecurity to bad delivery of services by the state, the more they endorse political change. The explanation here is obvious, if one’s human security is at stake because of the system, then it is reasonable to want to change that system. This was the case for both Bosniaks and Serbs. In the case of Serbs, this dynamic is reinforced by the fact that increased levels of civic engagement related to lower levels of human security. For this group, when civic engagement derives from insecurity, it relates positively to support for political integration.

Policy recommendation
While the absence of human security due to the fragility of state institutions can lead citizens (especially Bosniaks and Serbs) to seek political change, it can also backfire and have an adverse effect on intergroup relations. Human security is ultimately essential, in order to sustain political change. Steps need to be taken at state level to address the human security concerns of the citizens of BiH and special emphasis should be placed on protecting citizens from crime.
Finding 3
While reconciliation levels between the three main ethnic groups are relatively high, trust between Bosniaks and Serbs is low. In particular, the low levels of trust reported by Serbs towards Bosniaks are detrimental to support for political integration.

Discussion
While Bosniaks and Serbs have come some way in terms of reconciliation, trust between the two groups remains relatively low, with levels below the midpoint. Trust is crucial to sustainable peace and the development of a joint vision of the future.

For Serbs, mistrust of Bosniaks was associated with reduced support for political integration. Trust of Bosniaks was negatively associated with pejorative stereotypes for Bosniaks and cultural distance from them. However, trust of Bosniaks was also positively associated with higher levels of contact. We will be emphasising the importance of contact below, but suffice to say that the fact that contact and trust are positively correlated is extremely welcome, as it suggests that the contact taking place between the two groups is of a kind that promotes more trusting relationships.

Finally, it should be noted that Croats reported high levels of trust in the other two groups. This, in combination with the fact that regions in the BiH which are tri-ethnic are also more reconciliatory, points to the possibility that Croats could act as potential intermediaries between Bosniaks and Serbs.

Policy recommendation
Any measures taken towards building greater trust, particularly between the Bosniak and Serb populations would be a move in the right direction. We advise however, that such attempts should include Croats.

Finding 4
Contact emerges as a significant predictor of political integration across ethnic groups.

Discussion
For Serbs, contact with Bosniaks led to a greater wish for political integration. The same was true for Bosniaks who had contact with Croats. However, for Croats, contact with Serbs was negatively associated with political integration. In attempting to explain this we suggested that since levels of contact between the groups were relatively low to
start with, it was possible that those Croats who elected to have contact with Serbs also endorsed Serb aspirations for autonomy, in other words that they would, by definition, be against political integration.

Contact does however, have a positive effect when it comes to greater political unity among the three ethnic groups, in the case of contact between Serbs and Bosniaks and between Croats and Bosniaks. More contact was significantly associated with less cultural distance across groups and more trust in the case of Bosniaks.

Given that contact between the ethnic groups could have well had the opposite effect, contributing to greater levels of distrust and estrangement, the fact that contact was connected with a more reconciliatory approach to begin with and with greater willingness to endorse political integration as a result of that, is very important.

**Policy recommendation**
Policy makers often think that by inserting boundaries between groups and reducing contact, they reduce opportunities for friction. This does not seem to be the case for BiH. We therefore recommend that contact should not be obstructed wherever it is happening and that in those areas where contact is not happening it should be encouraged (but by no means imposed). In other words, authorities, CSOs and the international community should create optimal conditions for contact to happen naturally.

• **Finding 5**
Age was the single demographic variable found to be related to political integration and only for Serbs.

**Discussion**
The results show that younger Serbs are more open to political integration, to contact and to increased social ties with Bosniaks whom, unlike their elders, they do not perceive to be a threat.

**Policy recommendation**
It would be important to understand the deep concerns of older Serbs. The young generation of Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats, however, should be given the chance to develop a common vision for the country. The fact that they do not oppose contact and are willing to develop social ties means that the time is ripe for BiH to maximize possible settings where young people from all ethnic groups can work, interact, and live together.